Professor Craig Green joins the Decode DC podcast to talk about the 1944 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Korematsu v. United States, which validated putting American citizens in internment camps during wartime, based on their race or ethnicity. The court has never overturned the Korematsu decision, and as the 2016 presidential election approaches, the debate over the case has new life. Listen to the Podcast
A full generation of legal scholarship has analyzed methods of interpreting statutory and constitutional provisions. Different works have emphasized text, original intent, original reception, and dynamic “living” meaning as academics have argued over which methodological systems describe current practice, and which systems are normatively best. Comparable methodological debates have not occurred with respect to judicial decisions. This Article examines precedents as a third category of legal authorities that — much like statutes and constitutions — sometimes present vague answers to important legal questions. This Article’s system of precedential interpretation will challenge unexamined intuitions about “reading cases,” with collateral implications for statutory and constitutional interpretation as well. I consider four categories of historical materials to generate different sorts of precedential meaning: (i) an opinion’s text, indicating a decision’s declared meaning; (ii) adjudicative context, reflecting a precedent’s implied meaning; (iii) reception by contemporary analysts, which depict understood meaning; and (iv) subsequent doctrinal applications, which identify developmental meaning. These categories offer analogies to forms of textualism, originalism, and dynamism that are well known in other legal contexts. Different …
On March 16th, President Obama announced his nominee for the Supreme Court, Judge Merrick Garland. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has repeatedly said that the next president will decide the next supreme court justice. Professor Craig Green joined WHYY’s RadioTimes to discuss Obama’s selection, its implications, and any potential impact on the 2016 campaign. Listen to the Episode
Some prospective students think they can “get a head start” on law school, but for most folks, it’s even more important to arrive fresh and ready to work.
A full generation of legal scholarship has analyzed methods of interpreting statutory and constitutional provisions. Different works have emphasized text, original intent, original reception, and dynamic “living” meaning as academics have argued over which methodological systems describe current practice, and which systems are normatively best. Comparable methodological debates have not occurred with respect to judicial decisions. This Article examines precedents as a third category of legal authorities that — much like statutes and constitutions — sometimes present vague answers to important legal questions. This Article’s system of precedential interpretation will challenge unexamined intuitions about “reading cases,” with collateral implications for statutory and constitutional interpretation as well. I consider four categories of historical materials to generate different sorts of precedential meaning: (i) an opinion’s text, indicating a decision’s declared meaning; (ii) adjudicative context, reflecting a precedent’s implied meaning; (iii) reception by contemporary analysts, which depict understood meaning; and (iv) subsequent doctrinal applications, which identify developmental meaning. These categories offer analogies to forms of textualism, originalism, and dynamism that are well known in other legal contexts. Different …
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