All posts tagged: Rules of Evidence

“Gruesome” Evidence, Science, and Rule 403

Can science step in and assist in Rule 403 determinations of “unfair prejudice”? When confronted with “gruesome” evidence, all too often autopsy photos or images of severe injuries, judges must assess whether there is a risk of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury and then, if the risk is present, “may” exclude the proof.1 Yet there is no court-dictated workable metric for assessing when either risk is present beyond boilerplate terminology such as whether the “[e]vidence… makes a conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury’s attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.”2 The standard is akin to that used to describe when material is obscene — an “I know it when I see it” approach to decision-making.3 This approach begets arbitrariness. That this is so may be seen by contrasting claims of unfair prejudice in criminal and civil cases. The default in criminal seems to be that of admissibility, demonstrated in the extreme …

Courtroom

The “Personal Knowledge” Rule: An Evidence Principle Worth Considering

Rare is the case [excepting expert testimony] where a witness is not describing what s/he claims to have seen, heard, smelled, touched or tasted. Without that sensory connection to the item at issue, there would be no relevance; and most lawyers abstain from calling a witness to testify to what was behind a closed door or occurring in a far-away location. So what’s the “personal knowledge” fuss? Perhaps the answer comes, first, from acknowledging that for some reason the drafters of the Federal Rules [and corresponding state codes of evidence] felt the need to include it in addition to the foundational requirement that only relevant evidence be admitted. Indeed, the comment to the personal knowledge rule – Rule 602 – makes clear that it is merely “a specialized application of the provisions of Rule 104(b) on conditional relevancy.” Yet the Rule is there – so it must have some meaning. For the advocate, the reason for the ‘fuss’ derives directly from the existence of the rule – it is now a tool available to a …