All posts tagged: Evidence

Incorrect Math Equation

Learning From Mistakes: An Imperfect Cross-Examination

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“By seeking and blundering we learn” – Goethe “I have not failed. I’ve just found 10,000 ways that won’t work” – Thomas Edison. “A spelling mistake in the DNA of a gene within the brain seems to impair the ability of a person to improve their performance based on knowledge of earlier errors.” – News Story, The Telegraph, 2007. The first two quotes above are inspirational and reflect insight; the third, sadly, seems to fit many lawyers who never recognize their errors and thus persist in their bad habits, especially in the courtroom. It is probably not genetic, but the recurrence argues for a model where we study error, diagnose and diagram it, and then take corrective steps. That is the rationale for this and forthcoming “learning from mistakes” columns. Although there are no hard data to back up this assertion, it is undeniable that poorly constructed cross-examinations occur on a daily basis in courtrooms across this nation. And they are conducted by lawyers with years of experience who, sadly, don’t recognize mistakes and learn …

Checklist

Do Lawyers Need Checklists to Reduce Error?

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Can checklists reduce lawyer error? As they do for doctors or airline pilots or building engineers? Although the focus on this technique has largely been outside of the realm of the legal system, there is enough known to say that its application to lawyers is both necessary and likely to be beneficial. That lawyers do make errors, and errors of grave consequence, cannot be doubted. While it has been written that “[n]o empirical research exists regarding error rates by lawyers, but it is reasonable to assume they make errors as often as doctors[,]’ McClurg, FIGHT CLUB: DOCTORS VS. LAWYERS – A PEACE PLAN GROUNDED IN SELF-INTEREST, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 309, 349 (2011), there are some estimates if not hard data. The late Justice Scalia, when defending death penalty jurisprudence and practice, famously (or perhaps infamously) quoted a New York Times article that “the error rate [in criminal cases is] .027 percent–or, to put it another way, a success rate of 99.973 percent.” Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (U.S. 2006). Of course, this …

Reptile

Reptiles in the Courtroom

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It is remarkable, as one reads cases, to find a series of published ORDERS in which judges tell lawyers to keep the “reptile” theory out of the courtroom. THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Defendant Ruta Obergfell, M.D.’s Motion in Limine #1 to Preclude Impermissible Use of the Reptile Theory, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED. The Plaintiffs and their counsel are hereby barred from arguing or soliciting testimony based on the REPTILE theory including, but not limited to, making arguments or soliciting evidence concerning “community safety or protection,” “public safety or protection,” “safety rules,” “sending a message, “needlessly endangering patients,” or “being guardians of the community.” Hopper v. Ruta, 2013 Colo. Dist. LEXIS 249, *1 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2013). See also, Pracht v. Saga Freight Logistics, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149775, *4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2015)(“ Defendants’ motion to prohibit any Golden Rule argument and/or Reptile Theory questions and argument is GRANTED.”). A less successful attempt occurred more recently, …

Witness Impeachment

Impeaching By Omission

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The art of witness impeachment is inextricably bound with the substantive law of evidence. Evidence rules explicitly allow for impeachment of any witness (even one called by the party) and set the procedures for attacking with inconsistencies – the impeaching document need not be shown to the witness, and impeachment must occur with there being some opportunity for the witness to respond and explain. But the rules are silent on at least two critical issues – the why of impeachment, and a definition of what exactly makes a prior statement “inconsistent.” The former question is one answered not in evidence law but in the art and techniques of advocacy. We impeach witnesses to discredit in-court testimony and show them to be liars or mistaken and unreliable. We impeach witnesses to tell or support our own story. We impeach witnesses for the drama it brings to the courtroom and the control it places in the hands of the questioner. As to when a prior statement is “inconsistent,” there is little in terms of a definition beyond inconsistency being in the eye of the advocate/beholder, with a judge viewing …

Man Signing Document

The Prior Statement: If It Isn’t Signed, Is It Impeachment Material?

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How should judges approach a case where a testifying witness is going to be impeached, but the impeaching document was not created or adopted by the witness?  What is the rule when the impeaching lawyer has a report by person “B” that avers what testifying witness “A” allegedly said?  The rule, as is developed below, should be to allow the impeachment if the examiner has a good faith reason to believe the statement was made. The impeachment of a witness with her/his own words, showing a change of story that establishes poor memory, unreliability, or outright mendacity, creates excitement in the courtroom.   As explained by Wigmore, “the purpose is to induce the tribunal to discard the one statement because the witness had also made another statement which cannot at the same time be true.”  3A Wigmore, Evidence § 1040 at 1048 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).  See also, United States v. Damatta-Olivera, 37 M.J. 474, 477-478 (C.M.A. 1993).  A Pennsylvania case put it more eloquently: The question of credibility sometimes depends on the slightest inclination of the …

“Gruesome” Evidence, Science, and Rule 403

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Can science step in and assist in Rule 403 determinations of “unfair prejudice”? When confronted with “gruesome” evidence, all too often autopsy photos or images of severe injuries, judges must assess whether there is a risk of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury and then, if the risk is present, “may” exclude the proof.1 Yet there is no court-dictated workable metric for assessing when either risk is present beyond boilerplate terminology such as whether the “[e]vidence… makes a conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury’s attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.”2 The standard is akin to that used to describe when material is obscene — an “I know it when I see it” approach to decision-making.3 This approach begets arbitrariness. That this is so may be seen by contrasting claims of unfair prejudice in criminal and civil cases. The default in criminal seems to be that of admissibility, demonstrated in the extreme …

Baggage

Taking the Sting Out: Using Direct Examination to Anticipate and Undercut Attacks on Your Witness

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Sadly, it can be the rare witness who does not come with some baggage – a criminal conviction, a potential bias, an inconsistent statement, or some other challenge to her/his credibility. So, the proponent of that witness has to make a choice – bring it out first, or simply wait for the sting of cross-examination. The suggestion of this article is to do the former, a technique supported by law and, as importantly, by the tenets of solid advocacy. As litigators, we are told emphatically that a witness’ credibility may not be bolstered before it is attacked. But this is wrong in two regards – the limitation is actually as to bolstering with character for truthfulness, which may occur only after an averment of the witness having an untruthful character; and it is inapposite when the form of bolstering has the appearance of attacking one’s own witness. Abundant caselaw makes this point. As explained by the First Circuit nearly thirty years ago, “[t]he prosecution, having called a witness, may then ‘take the wind out of …

Empty Jury Box in Nebraska

When There’s Only “Reasonable Doubt”

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Law students are taught that the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard is the bedrock of the justice system, one that is desirable because, as Blackstone declared, it is “better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” But does that resonate with jurors? In other words, when a lawyer argues that “the prosecution can’t prove this person guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’ is the message not one of innocence but of a concession of probable or potential guilt? Does it smack of gamesmanship? And is it easy for lay persons, not in the halls of academe but in courts in cities where crime may be prevalent, to apply? These questions were brought to mind when reading a news account of a high profile murder trial with substantial evidence of guilt but also some reasons to doubt. As reported in the news media (not necessarily the source for a verbatim accounting of a courtroom proceeding), the defense lawyer’s opening emphasized that there was no physical evidence linking the accused to the killings, no gun …

Courtroom

The “Personal Knowledge” Rule: An Evidence Principle Worth Considering

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Rare is the case [excepting expert testimony] where a witness is not describing what s/he claims to have seen, heard, smelled, touched or tasted. Without that sensory connection to the item at issue, there would be no relevance; and most lawyers abstain from calling a witness to testify to what was behind a closed door or occurring in a far-away location. So what’s the “personal knowledge” fuss? Perhaps the answer comes, first, from acknowledging that for some reason the drafters of the Federal Rules [and corresponding state codes of evidence] felt the need to include it in addition to the foundational requirement that only relevant evidence be admitted. Indeed, the comment to the personal knowledge rule – Rule 602 – makes clear that it is merely “a specialized application of the provisions of Rule 104(b) on conditional relevancy.” Yet the Rule is there – so it must have some meaning. For the advocate, the reason for the ‘fuss’ derives directly from the existence of the rule – it is now a tool available to a …

Microscope

When Must Lawyers Learn Science?

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How should judges evaluate lawyers’ alleged mishandling of forensic science evidence when the challenge is brought years after the trial? One recent United States Supreme Court decision grapples with this; and this article contextualizes that holding, analyzes its weaknesses, and suggests some factors for judges to weigh. In criminal cases, the importance of science (and understanding the limits of science) cannot be gainsaid. The statistics are clear: in a review of homicide cases in Cleveland, Ohio, the clearance rate was higher [63.1%] for cases with probative results — either matches or exclusions — than in cases without such evidence [56.3%], and the average sentence imposed was higher in the former category. Yet there is a confounding problem – the consumers of forensic evidence have little or no scientific training, either at the college level or ‘on the job.’ Perhaps 5% of lawyers [and judges] studied science, a number presented in research papers and confirmed repeatedly by polling attendees at legal education conferences. And the consequences are severe. The scientific illiteracy of lawyers was highlighted in …