Alexander Rojavin ’20, Law & Public Policy Scholar
Alexander Rojavin is a multilingual intelligence, media, and policy analyst specializing in information warfare. He is currently working on a book on modern Russian cinema as a key battlefield in the Kremlin’s information war. He is also co-chair of the Symposium on Disinformation Studies. In his spare time, he moonlights as a published literary translator (Routledge, Slavica Publishers, forthcoming Academic Studies Press).
In the eight since 2014, the dominant themes in Russia’s Kremlin-affiliated news media could be divided into eight categories: three “defensive” ones (Russian Leadership, Soviet Nostalgia, and Russian Exceptionalism) and five “offensive” ones (State Weakness and Dysfunction, Western Hypocrisy, Provocation, Jewish-Ukrainian Fascist Junta, and Russophobia). Each theme can be manifested in distinct variations (“strains”), and a single news article can employ multiple themes simultaneously. This taxonomy is not the only viable one, but it is fairly exhaustive in capturing the Kremlin’s information operations. Below is a brief definition of each theme.
We must also understand that these themes are being deployed on front pages on which they are interspersed with distracting material about cute animals, celebrity outrages, and zodiacs—mainstays of Russian news coverage that numb the reader into a false sense that everything is normal in the world. Such articles should not be considered as strains of a ninth dominant theme, but it is important to keep in mind that articles published on Russian outlets’ front pages work holistically. Even if individual trees are not frightening, the forest taken together is a place of nightmare and delusion in which the Kremlin alone stands out as a beacon of light and order.
Russian Leadership
Articles featuring this theme stress how competent and responsible Russia’s reigning regime is. Whether it is strengthening the economy, inventing new technology, benevolently listening to the worries of average Russians, or leading international development efforts, the exploits covered in these articles are designed to leave the reader with an impression of the Kremlin’s far-reaching vision, ability, and drive. All narrative strains featuring Russian paternalism fall under this theme—an article might ostensibly be about the success of an allied regime, but the subtext is that the success is actually owed to Russia’s sage counsel or support.
Relevant variation: A key variation of this theme is featured in articles supporting and depicting as competent pro-Russian, fifth column elements in Ukraine and elsewhere. Strains of this sub-theme (or “meta-narrative”) are used domestically to convince readers that politicians and other actors sympathetic to the Putin regime are thriving. Abroad, such strains are used for electoral interference, e.g. in support of Jill Stein, Bernard Sanders, and Donald Trump in United States 2016, Geert Wilders in Netherlands 2017, Marine le Pen in France 2017, Carles Puigdemont in Spain 2017, etc. Most recently, such strains were deployed in support of Hungarian PM Viktor Orban, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, and Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s National Rally.
Soviet Nostalgia
This theme plays up the nostalgia factor of Russia’s Soviet heritage. The objects of nostalgia can be cultural (e.g. films, shows, and music that are still popular), mundane (communal apartments, a tighter society, a lack of “decadent,” “liberal,” “gay” European values), military (“the Soviet army was the mightiest force in the world,” oxymoronically at odds with another narrative that Russia’s current army is equally mighty), etc. This theme is leveraged to smooth the adoption of regressive, repressive, Soviet-style policies and the pursuit of geopolitical objectives ostensibly aimed at restoring a “Great Soviet State.”
Russian Exceptionalism
The third “defensive” theme is exactly what it says on the tin: Russia is unique, no other state is as unique as Russia. The West will never understand Russian culture, history, greatness, etc. This theme can be used to justify just about anything, from renaming a street in honor of Stalin to invading another nation. After February 2022, one manifestation of this theme is deployed to draw a contrast between Russian stars who remained in the country after the beginning of the “special operation” and those cultural traitors who fled.
State Weakness and Dysfunction
The first of the “offensive” themes is present in any article designed to show the fecklessness and helplessness of Western democracies—whichever one needs to be taken down a notch at any given time, from Montenegro (after Russia’s failed coup attempt) and France (any time Macron gives Russia some cheek) to Ukraine (at all time, in all situations). This theme has been constantly prevalent in Russian news media, kept at a healthy simmer to remind everyone that the West is terrible and Russia is much better by comparison. A persistent strain of this theme involves articles depicting life in Ukraine as awful. Shortly before the war, this theme was visible in articles arguing that Ukraine was a failure at the Olympics.
An article may ostensibly be about a water shortage in a small Belgian town or about an insect infestation somewhere in Slovenia, but the subtext is that the West is woefully unable to handle any of its challenges, domestic or international, small or large.
Western Hypocrisy
Articles featuring this theme are intended to frame something about the West’s rhetoric or actions as self-defeatingly hypocritical and therefore amoral. Such articles are designed to delegitimize the West in the eyes of the reader. This theme is inherited directly from the Soviet Union, which often dipped into the well of “the United States preaches freedom and tolerance but is actually ruthlessly discriminatory towards minority groups.” After February 2022, this theme is seen in articles lambasting Western leaders for saying that they supposedly do not want to “escalate tensions with Russia,” but then send weapons to Ukraine—naturally, that should be the source of the reader’s ire, not Russia’s invasion and mass murder of civilians.
Provocation
Another straightforward theme: any time Russia does something flagrant (e.g. invades Ukraine, invades Syria, passes yet another repressive amendment to the criminal code), these articles will inevitably argue either that Russia is simply responding to an ill-wisher’s provocation or that Russia didn’t do it and the victim did it themselves. Ukraine was invaded because Russian-speakers were being oppressed, troops were sent into Syria because our dear friend Assad called for aid, and “homosexual propaganda” is banned because there’s no room for that in our wholesome Orthodox culture. Throughout the war, strains borne of this theme are deployed every single time Russian soldiers are accused of yet another crime: “We didn’t do it—it was actually the Ukrainians themselves!” Shortly before the war, there were Russian outlets vociferously arguing that Ukraine might invade Russia at any moment.
Relevant variation: All narrative strains depicting an imperialist, warmongering West fall under this theme.
Russophobia
Closely related to the Provocation theme, this theme is a catchall defense that Russian officials can use to discredit or delegitimize any Western accusation or move on the grounds that it is simply irrational fear of Russian culture, greatness, history, etc.
Relevant variation: All narrative strains depicting a sympathetic, unjustly victimized Russia fall under this theme. The key difference between articles leaning into Russophobia versus those leaning into the Provocation theme is the intent of the geopolitical adversary; if the purpose is to depict the act adverse to Russia’s interests as irrational and foaming-at-the-mouth, then it is a manifestation of the Russophobia theme. If the adversary is depicted as calculating and coldly acting against Russian—and global—interests, then the coverage is a manifestation of the Provocation theme.
Jewish-Ukrainian Fascist Junta
Russian media’s favorite theme since 2014—it is difficult to overstate how prevalent demonizing coverage of Ukraine was in Russia’s information space. This theme’s aim was always to discredit the Ukrainian regime and any non-Kremlin-supported party as legitimate. It was also a blazing signal pyre that Russia would ultimately invade, using this very theme as the invasion’s primary justification.
Strains of this theme portray the Ukrainian government and its sympathizers as radical chauvinists who will go to any length to purge Ukraine of anything that falls outside of their narrow vision of Ukrainian identity. Such articles often employ typical Ukrainophobic tropes (calling Ukrainians “Banderites” banderovtsy, violent zealots of Stepan Bandera) and anti-Semitic tropes (Jews are controlling the government, banks, media, etc.—standard Rothschild Conspiracy variations). A key strain of this theme is that Ukraine is controlled by the West.