Alexander Rojavin ’20, Law & Public Policy Scholar
Alexander Rojavin is a multilingual intelligence, media, and policy analyst specializing in information warfare. He is currently working on a book on modern Russian cinema as a key battlefield in the Kremlin’s information war. He is also co-chair of the Symposium on Disinformation Studies. In his spare time, he moonlights as a published literary translator (Routledge, Slavica Publishers, forthcoming Academic Studies Press).
What follows is a chronicle of key events and trends on the information battlefield from day 73 through day 96 of the Russian-Ukrainian war for democracy.
In the interest of space, this report will not catalogue each day’s highlights, as events in the past three weeks have been progressing without too many anomalies. Instead, I would like to bring readers’ attention to some of these key anomalies and sweeping takeaways from this period of the war, in which Russia’s offensive in the east, despite securing limited tactical gains, is beginning to show signs of exhaustion, while Ukraine’s defense continues to hold despite inconceivably delayed Western military aid, which, if delivered earlier, would’ve ensured that the war was already in its last stages.
Remedial Lessons from May 9th
Following Victory Day, Russia’s information space again settled wholly into the eight-theme paradigm. The anticlimax of May 9th should serve as yet another lesson for Western analysts and media that hanging on to every word uttered by authoritarian mouthpieces is not a proactive strategy. Indeed, doing so only plays into the self-aggrandizing image desired by an authoritarian regime. Keeping close tabs on an authoritarian information space is necessary to divine the regime’s intent or what bothers it the most, but onlookers must understand (1) that there is often no farsighted strategic genius governing the information space’s activity and (2) that keeping such close tabs risks conditioning the onlooker into a reactive mindset that prioritizes taking cues from simplistic authoritarian information operations rather than dictating the terms of the information war. Authoritarian regimes are not known for innovation in information warfare—their strategies all typically follow the same playbook. The Kremlin is not playing well—the built-up importance of May 9th was predominantly a function of Western coverage. In this way, May 9th should be viewed, if not as an inflection point, then as a remedial lesson for Western onlookers.
Current State of Russia’s Information Space
At this time, the Kremlin’s mouthpieces are locked into a holding pattern, with few deviations from the last weeks’ dominant trends. While Russian media, lacking any strategic or operational victories, have been doing this since the war began, there is a noticeable spike in their trying to pass off minor tactical achievements as operation-dynamic-altering successes. The Kremlin’s impatience to reach the administrative border of Luhansk is on glaring display across Russian media, which are crowing about Russia’s tactical military successes in Ukraine’s east with almost orgasmic fervor. Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s attempts are complicated by Ukraine’s defense of Severodonetsk, which can continue holding for a time longer. Russia’s coverage is unfolding as it is to dupe the layperson into thinking that Russia’s military plans are unfolding swimmingly and to lay the rhetorical foundation for declaring a milestone victory—the capture of Luhansk (Oblast’)—even though it is still not a sure thing and, even if accomplished, it would actually exhaust the Russian forces for no significant operational advantage.
In their spare time, Russian media are also trying to push their perceived advantage by assuring domestic audiences that Europe is in a hopeless state of disarray—a narrative handily fueled by European nations’ delay in sending Ukraine critical military aid.
Meanwhile, though Russia’s legislature is taking worried steps to create additional enforcement mechanisms of the growing number of Free Russia Legion sympathizers, Russian media are so far choosing to elide most mention of discord, let alone fledgling rebellion, within Russia.
Sandu Administration Boldness
Seeing the Kremlin’s geopolitical potency steadily diminish, the administration of Moldova’s President Maia Sandu has grown more confident. On May 18th, President Sandu unequivocally stated that Russian “peacekeepers” stationed in Transnistria need to—put diplomatically—leave Moldovan territory, of which Transnistria is an inviolable part.
On May 25th, police arrested Moldova’s previous (vehemently pro-Kremlin) president Igor Dodon on (well-founded) charges of corruption and treason. Following President Sandu’s statement the previous week about Russian troops in Transnistria, this was a blazing signal that the Sandu government is ready to act on the Russian blood it senses in the water. Precisely to what length it is willing to go is another question, but the logjam has broken.
Kremlin-aligned outlets are, predictably, rather disquieted by this development.
Russian Media Disquiet
While these reports have brought the reader’s attention to post-Soviet frozen conflict zones, they have not discussed Russia’s coverage of these zones, which grows feverish any time there appears to be progress towards resolving such a zone.
Accordingly, as with Moldova, Russian media have been assiduously following any potentially anti-Kremlin disturbances, including in Armenia and in Georgia. Conversely, Russian media are quick to herald any Kremlin-aligned success in post-Soviet space, such as in Turkmenistan, where the Turkmen dictator Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov passed on the torch to his son Serdar—naturally, with the Kremlin’s blessing.
Armenia in particular has figured prominently in Russian media. Following the Azerbaijani violation of Armenia’s border in 2021—a function of yet another Russian-cultivated frozen conflict zone in Nagorno-Karabakh—the situation in Armenia became critical, with mass protests in their fourth week now over Prime Minister Pashinyan’s purported consideration of acknowledging Nagorno-Karabakh as (rightfully) Azerbaijani. Many Armenians are opposed to the prospect and have been calling for his resignation.
As a reminder, Pashinyan originally came to power after the Velvet Revolution in 2018, which finally forced Armenia’s own authoritarian-adjacent Serzh Sargsyan to resign.
Russian media have been covering things closely, and Russia’s leadership/meditation in the conflict has been an informational sanctuary for beleaguered Kremlin-aligned outlets. The Kremlin has no interest in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh situation, seeing as the frozen conflict zone is yet another lever of power on which Russia can rely in this part of post-Soviet space. Consequently, Russian media have been doing what they can to weaken Prime Minister Pashinyan in the eyes of their readers and to delegitimize the prospect of resolving Nagorno-Karabakh’s status.
May 19th New York Times Editorial
Much criticism has already been levelled at the New York Times for its ethically barren, culturally ignorant editorial (to which I will not link) urging the United States not to become too involved with the war and suggesting that Ukraine might need to sacrifice part of its sovereign territory (I’d be curious to hear the NYT editorial board’s advice if, say, Canada successfully invaded Maine or if Mexico made a play for Texas—would we too need to make “hard decisions?”).
The editorial board writes: “It is imperative that the Ukrainian government’s decisions be based on a realistic assessment of its means and how much more destruction Ukraine can sustain.” A chorus of high-ranking Ukrainian officials have already made clear their win condition (which has been supported by both the White House and Downing Street): a resounding military defeat for Russia and the liberation of all Ukrainian territories, including the oblast’s of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea.
“Confronting this reality may be painful, but it is not appeasement.” Hang on, let’s consult a definition of “appeasement”: “a policy of making political, material, or territorial concessions to an aggressive power in order to avoid conflict.” Well. There goes that argument.
“Mr. Putin has invested too much personal prestige in the invasion to back down.” As did Hitler in his genocidal pursuit—I guess, according to the NYT’s editorial board, the West mishandled WWII by entering the war. Europe was wrong to stand united against Napoleon. A dictator with a big enough stick should be allowed to do as he pleases.
I will repeat this again and again and again: Western media have conditioned themselves to look at things from a Kremlin-as-primary-agent point of view. This is poisonous. It stymies a proper evaluation of Western policies. And it is incongruous with a clear-eyed pursuit of democratic outcomes.
Continued Dialogue with Putin
On May 23rd, after the NYT editorial, in response to President Macron’s incessant phone calls with Putin, Polish Prime Minister Morawiecki ridiculed the ineffectual, self-defeating, self-effacing attempts at good-faith dialogue with Putin. “How many times have you negotiated with Putin? What have you achieved?.. Please, name a single success that has resulted from your negotiations with Vladimir Putin. Many politicians have tried, and the result has always been the same: disgrace.”
Undeterred, on May 29th, President Macron and Chancellor Scholz had a three-way phone call with Putin, prompting an Estonian MP Marko Mikhelson to marvel: “It’s unbelievable how France and Germany’s current leaders unwittingly lay the ground for renewed acts of violence from Russia. Macron and Scholz’s 80-minute phone call with Putin inevitably begs the rephrasing of Macron himself—is this not brain death?”
He continued: “It would be more logical to help Ukraine resist the aggression and eventually defeat Russia…Macron and Scholz should hang up the phone and visit Ukraine. I hope that Macron and Scholz’s strange acts are motivated not by a fear of losing influence in a democratic Europe, which will inevitably include Ukraine after its military victory, and eventually Moldova and Georgia, and Belarus will free itself from de facto Russian occupation.”
Dialogue with Putin—especially repeated dialogue, as in President Macron’s case—only legitimizes him. It continues framing the Kremlin as the primary agent in this war rather Ukraine or the West. They should be the ones driving the agenda rather than looking like lapdogs running to the Kremlin’s heel.
RU Propaganda Faux-pas—Tulip
A brief example of Russian propaganda’s “triumph”: on May 22nd, Russian propagandist Aleksandr Kots showed the image of a 2S4 Tyulpan (literally “tulip”) heavy mortar. Kots bragged about the Russian forces’ military capabilities. In response, Ukrainian forces used the video to geo-locate the mortar and summarily destroyed it.
In the military and intelligence communities, this is called an “oops.”
Concluding Thoughts
The West is still waking from its decades-long lethargic sleep. Some segments of the Western elite are insistently unable to shake off the misguided realpolitik lens through which they have long viewed the world—if you can even call their worldview realpolitik, as adherence to an ideology dominated by pragmatism and self-interest would have necessitated swift intercession on Ukraine’s behalf before the war even began. Then again, that would have required an understanding of the failures of appeasement, of the mindless insatiability of the Russian regime, and of the regime’s underlying cultural and historical mechanisms.
This war is a civilizational one. It will result in a world whose geopolitics and global organization have undergone tectonic shifts. I have confidence that the West will accept this eventuality and will rise to the historical challenge—but the free world and all those aspiring to it would be better served by its doing so soon.