Alexander Rojavin ’20, Law & Public Policy Scholar
Alexander Rojavin is a multilingual intelligence, media, and policy analyst specializing in information warfare. He is currently working on a book on modern Russian cinema as a key battlefield in the Kremlin’s information war. He is also co-chair of the Symposium on Disinformation Studies. In his spare time, he moonlights as a published literary translator (Routledge, Slavica Publishers, forthcoming Academic Studies Press).
What follows is a chronicle of key events and trends on the information battlefield from day 71 through day 72 of the Russian-Ukrainian war for democracy.
The reason for this brief report is to cover the latest in the Kremlin’s information operations in the lead-up to May 9th, which will likely mark another inflection point in the war.
On May 9th, the Kremlin will make a series of announcements that could span an array of topics. These topics include but are not limited to: an attack on Moldova; mobilization; closing Russia’s borders; declaring a fictitious victory, partial or total, and continuing the war; declaring victory and ending the war. Any of these subjects—and more—may come up, and any of them may be pushed in full force or utterly rejected. It is not helpful to speculate what exactly Putin will say, because that will be in flux until the speech itself. But it is helpful to understand the possible combination of moves he can announce on May 9th and all the possible outcomes of his announcements. The same rule applies to many of the instances described in these reports: it is not always possible to predict exactly where a volley on the information battlefield will lead, but it is always possible to predict all the places it could lead.
At this point, all trends and anomalies documented below or omitted from this report will connect to what the Kremlin announces on May 9th.
The last thing to note is that the international hype now surrounding May 9th is exactly what Putin and his bootlicking junta want most: the world’s rapt attention, people hanging on to every word he, the Emperor, says. This will be the culmination of the Kremlin’s pageantry since February 24th, and the utmost care will be taken with the stagecraft, triply so in light of the failures of the “special operation.”
Day 71: May 5
(1) As Russian forces stormed Azovstal’ for a third day straight, the Kremlin pretended that no such thing was happening: “Putin’s order not to storm Azovstal’ is still in force,” said Kremlin Press Secretary Peskov. This particular strain was being pushed for domestic audiences and useful idiots.
(2) Conceivably related to whatever is in store for May 9th, in another obvious provocation, Belgorod’s governor and Russian media reported that “Ukrainian forces shelled two villages,” damaging power lines and five civilian buildings. A helpful rule of thumb is: if Russian media are alleging that Ukrainian forces hit a target on Russian territory, then it’s a Russian provocation, because it likely features civilian targets and is meant to spread hatred of the desperate Ukrainian barbarians. If, however, the target is military or critical infrastructure, then Russian media will likely cover it without assigning blame or fail to mention it at all—and this is assuredly the work of either Ukrainian forces or Ukrainian-aligned saboteurs.
(3) Russian media continued to maintain the heat on the subject of Transnistria, alleging that there was shooting on the border with Ukraine. This was not a significant enough development to immediately presage an attack on Moldova, but it is one stone in the completed rhetorical foundation that the Kremlin needs to begin a campaign there.
(4) Much of the coverage regarding May 9th is focused on the miscellanea of parade-planning: for example, how air force artillerymen are preparing to celebrate and where one could watch fireworks in Moscow.
(5) The Kremlin has conceded that there will be no May 9th parade in Luhansk or Donetsk. This could signal that the Kremlin is acknowledging reality and taming its ambitions, meaning that it is preparing to wind things down on May 9th, hence why Russia is currently trying to overwhelm Ukrainian forces in what Oleksiy Arestovych dubbed a “Zerg rush,” to take as much as it can by Victory Day. Alternatively, this might be an unrelated acknowledgement of reality.
(6) Citizen Lukashenko announced that the special operation has “dragged on.” Curiously, a slew of Russian outlets reported on this. This may have been an independent statement that Lukashenko did not coordinate with the Kremlin, and Russian outlets are reporting on it either (a) to let Lukashenko know that he’s on thin ice and warn him not to try to derail the war or (b) to work the comment into a broader effort to begin winding things down. Alternatively, Lukashenko did coordinate this comment with the Kremlin either (a) to lull audiences into a false sense of security that the Kremlin is winding things down shortly before the Kremlin augments its military efforts or (b) actually to begin winding things down after the current Zerg rush ends.
(7) Kremlin officials and media insistently denied that there will be a general mobilization announced on May 9th. In accordance with the ever-applicable principle that “the guilty mind betrays itself,” this is perhaps the clearest signal that the Kremlin is preparing to announce this very thing, but this cannot be asserted with any confidence. The Kremlin may do such a thing. But it is not set in stone.
Day 72: May 6
In preparation for May 9th, Russian media juggled a multitude of strains, addressing nuclear war, mobilization, NATO escalation, and more. Kremlin-aligned outlets also sent warnings to Lukashenko to behave and continued to vilify Israel, which has received many fleeing Russian artists and is handling an already-tense situation in the Middle East. Indicators are pointing to an ever-decreasing threat of nuclear war, but an increasing probability of redoubled Russian military efforts—though there remains a (rapidly dwindling) chance that the same strains are being prepared as part of an exit strategy.
(1) Narrative strains addressing the use of nuclear weapons have progressed precisely as predicted. After engaging in nuclear saber-rattling for three weeks, Kremlin-aligned outlets are now vociferously, even somewhat fearfully, proclaiming that nuclear war is simply an impossibility. Orderly ranks of Kremlin officials and propagandists are lining up to say that Russia and the world have no need for mutually-assured nuclear destruction; even RT’s Margarita Simonyan carefully (not an adverb that can apply to her often) declared that a nuclear war is impossible, because humanity would “revert to the stone age.”
Additionally, Russian media are going the expected step further and saying that Russia is to thank for its de-escalation of the situation—after all, it was Russia that “convinced the United States and the nuclear five to confirm [their adherence to the rule that nuclear war should not be waged].”
Unlike in other instances (such as when Russia denied for a year that it would invade Ukraine), these denials likely hold water. The Kremlin’s plutocratic junta has keenly understood that a response to a nuclear strike would be swift and would eliminate not Russian people, about whom Putin does not care in the slightest, but Putin himself, in whichever bunker he may be hiding.
(2) Also as predicted, Russian media are leaning more heavily into strains that the conflict is not just one between Russia and Ukraine, but between Russia and NATO. Outlets continue to point fingers at the West, saying that “NATO is doing everything to ensure that hostilities…do not stop.” This complements repeated assertions that weapon convoys are legitimate military targets.
While these strains could be part of an exit strategy—not inconceivable, especially considering the emphatic, de-escalatory nuclear strains—they could just as easily be building up to more warmongering on May 9th. These strains have not yet crystallized enough to predict with any confidence in which direction the Kremlin plans to take them, but they are currently more likely intended NOT as an exit strategy and do presage increased military efforts.
(3) Russian media are faithfully maintaining the heat on the subject of Moldova (which they call “Moldavia” rather than “Moldova”). They are reporting, for instance, that Moldova’s Constitutional Court refuses to suspend the ban on the St. George ribbon and that Moldova’s energy supplies are dwindling—the logic of this strain being: “…and therefore we need to invade Moldavia to liberate the oppressed Russian-speaking populace of Moldavia to supply Moldavia with gas like the responsible Russian older brother that we are.” The Kremlin has the rhetorical foundation in place to attack Moldova, and these strains are doing nothing to dismantle that foundation.
(4) Putin may have apologized to Prime Minister Bennett (something that was NOT reported by Russian media), but Russian media aren’t done: they are continuing trying to set Russian audiences against Israel—for example, by pointing out the number of Israeli mercenaries fighting in Ukraine. Following the Kremlin’s meeting with Hamas representatives, the Kremlin’s suddenly unleashed anti-Semitism could correlate with a turbulent period for Israel.
(5) There is a still-growing chorus of denial regarding a general mobilization. The Kremlin clearly cognizes that the Russian populace has become unsettled by mobilization rumors, which have proliferated despite the Kremlin’s (imperfect) domestic information blockade. While these denials are as vehement as the denials of nuclear war, they belong to the category of “the guilty mind betrays itself.” To quote an op-ed by Dmitry Gudkov, a member of the Russian opposition, “if Peskov says that there won’t be a mobilization, it’s worth tensing up. Just in case.”
(6) Russian media are saying that Lukashenko was incorrect yesterday and that the “special operation is going according to plan.” This is clear evidence that Lukashenko’s comment that the war has dragged on was not coordinated with the Kremlin, and that the Kremlin is now sending him a warning. He, meanwhile, wants everything to end and to try to figure out how he can deal with the West again (a tall order at best, a near-impossibility as worst).
(7) There is a curious group of anomalous strains alleging that Ukraine’s western neighbors are planning to claim Ukrainian land. Today has seen articles on how Poland will steal Ukrainian land, how Lukashenko said that western Ukraine must be defended from Polish aggression, and how Hungary could easily take Zakarpattia Oblast’ to “liberate Hungarian-speakers” there.
(8) Russian media finally admitted that it really was Ukrainian forces that destroyed the Moskva—but only because Western intelligence gave them the ship’s exact location! Remember: Ukrainian forces are incapable of doing anything on their own and owe all of their victories to their Western puppet masters.
Concluding Thoughts
As analyzing Russia’s information space and cross-referencing it with knowledge of Russian culture, history, and psychology show that May 9th will likely be an inflection point, bringing with it an array of important developments. The West must be prepared for any of them.