Alexander Rojavin ’20, Law and Public Policy Scholar
Alexander Rojavin is a multilingual intelligence, media, and policy analyst specializing in information warfare. He is currently working on a book on modern Russian cinema as a key battlefield in the Kremlin’s information war. He is also co-chair of the Symposium on Disinformation Studies. In his spare time, he moonlights as a published literary translator (Routledge, Slavica Publishers, forthcoming Academic Studies Press).
What follows is a chronicle of key events, trends, and anomalies from day 139 through day 146 of the Russian-Ukrainian war for democracy.
This report summarizes the military situation across Ukraine, Ukraine’s politics and efforts in the information war, Russia’s politics and efforts in the information war, and related developments in Europe and elsewhere in the world.
Situation in Ukraine’s South
The situation in the south described in the last weeks continues to hold. Ukrainian forces are quietly, steadily advancing towards Kherson, while Russian forces continue to terrorize the civilian population with reckless shelling. Russian missiles fall across Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv oblast’s, injuring, for example, at least fourteen people in the city of Zaporizhzhia on July 13, hitting the city with MLRS on July 17, and destroying Mykolaiv’s infrastructure possibly with strikes from an S-300.
However, Russian morale remains in freefall despite rotations of Russian forces in the region. An emblematic intercepted phone call betrays the Russian forces’ panic when faced with Western heavy artillery: “They sit drinking coffee while we run around,” whines a Russian soldier. There are reports that Russian forces are withdrawing their equipment from Melitopol’. On July 16, a column of up to 100 units, including BMD-4s and APCs, moved through Mariupol’ towards Zaporizhzhia Oblast’.
Ukrainian forces, meanwhile, are pressing forward. As of July 14, 44 settlements had been liberated by the Ukrainian army in Kherson Oblast’, progress accompanied by repeated, surgical strikes against Russian ammo depots and command posts in the region. On July 17, a youthful member of the Ukrainian National Guard shot down a Russian Su-25 on the Zaporizhzhia front. On July 18, Ukrainian forces struck another target in occupied Nova Kakhovka, prompting jokes that a new Chornobayivka is being born.
Reports have also come in that much of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea has been relocated from Crimea to Russia.
Situation in Ukraine’s East
In the east, despite Lysychansk and Severodonetsk’s surrender, Russian forces are still, weeks later, unable to capture all of Luhansk Oblast’. Two villages (Bilhorivka and Verkhnekamenka) in Luhansk Oblast’ remain under Ukrainian control, and the Russians have repeatedly failed to push Ukrainian forces out of them. Russian forces nevertheless remain suicidally stubborn, and still committed to claiming all of Luhansk Oblast’, capturing Siversk, Donetsk Oblast’, and moving on to Slovyansk, Bakhmut, and Kramatorsk, which are the next major Ukrainian fortresses in the region.
Civilians perish in the east every day, in Donetsk Oblast’, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast’, and Kharkiv Oblast’, in which at least 959 civilians have been killed since February 24.
Ukrainian forces, however, are holding the line, launching intermittent surgical counterstrikes, as when they took out several Russian ammo depots in Luhansk Oblast’ at night on July 13. On July 18, Russian forces were repulsed on four parts of the eastern front, while battles for Siversk and Bakhmut continued, under the watchful eye of both Ukraine’s General Staff and Ukraine’s journalists.
Relatedly, per British intelligence, the Wagnerites have lost so many people in the campaign for Ukraine’s east that they have lowered the bar to entry for new recruits.
Elsewhere in Ukraine
Russia’s rocket terror has not ceased elsewhere in Ukraine too. On July 16, a missile struck Odesa, though it caused no casualties, thankfully. Russian missiles are also indiscriminately striking at targets in Sumy Oblast’. And in Vinnytsia, a massive missile strike on July 14 killed at least 20 people (including 3 children) and damaged 55 buildings.
Per Ukraine’s official count, at least 1,346 civilians have lost their lives in Kyiv Oblast’ since February 24.
And the SBU continues systematically tamping down on collaboration within the country. On July 17, SBU agents arrested the former head of the security service’s Crimean branch on allegations of treason.
Ukrainian Politics and Activity in the Information War
Ukraine’s government is actively engaged in international diplomacy and information efforts and in domestic reforms.
President Zelensky has made a number of high-profile personnel changes this week, seeking to replace officials whose performance during the war has been viewed as lacking. On July 13, he appointed a new governor of Chernivtsi. Then, on July 17, he fired both SBU head Ivan Bakanov and Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova. Bakanov’s firing had been discussed for over a week leading up to the dismissal, and the president separately justified his firing of the officials in his daily address, saying that a worrisome number of federal prosecutors and SBU agents has turned out to be collaborationists. (Rumors soon surfaced that Venediktova may be reassigned to a diplomatic post). On July 18, the Rada passed a resolution firing the Minister for Social Policy Maryna Lazebna, after which Prime Minister Shmyhal immediately put forth a replacement candidate: Oksana Zholnovich, the head of the Department of Social Policy and Healthcare of the Office of the President.
Ukraine’s media are closely following the race to replace Prime Minister Johnson. Many Ukrainians’ sympathies, voiced or otherwise, lie with Foreign Minister Liz Truss.
Ukraine’s diplomats remain hard at work. On July 13, Foreign Minister Kuleba, armed with coverage statistics, argued Ukraine is winning the information war against Russia—unlike in 2014. Kuleba wants one manifestation of Ukraine’s supremacy on the information front to be the successful sidelining of Russian athletes out of all major international sport events rather than having them perform under a neutral flag. Meanwhile, Ukraine was quick to respond when North Korea recognized the “DNR” and “LNR.” Mykhailo Podolyak in particular had an on-point response, saying that, before long, Russia’s boon companions like North Korea might well recognize the independence of Buryatia or Tyva (republics currently a part of the Russian Federation).
The Ukrainian government has also been fine-tuning its rhetoric regarding military service, holding the line that “military service in a democracy should be a personal choice to defend our common values—never a compelled decision or a punishment.” This rhetorical throughline is accompanying the General Staff’s regular updates and various statements from Defense Minister Reznikov and Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar that underscore the Ukrainian military’s competence. Reznikov, for example, stated that some 50% of all Russian missiles never reach their targets thanks to Ukraine’s anti-air capabilities, and Malyar, always on rhetorical cleanup duty, is again asking the general public for restraint—this time regarding information about Ukrainian POWs, whose return could be complicated if civilians blab too much about them.
For all of Ukraine’s unity, however, bickering and cheap, theatrical speculation among Ukraine’s political class has resumed in full force. Predominantly, the internal political battle lines are between President Zelensky’s and former President Poroshenko’s factions, with the latter having been attempting to score political potshots since at least the siege of Azovstal’. The three major outlets owned by Poroshenko’s allies—Espreso, Priamyi, and Channel 5—have been frequently publishing material critical or near-critical of the current administration and its oversight of the war. The frequency is not quite pre-war levels, but a perusal of Espreso’s homepage will not leave one with the impression that the outlet is particularly fond of President Zelensky.
Other factions are, naturally, also part of the fray. The Kremlin-fostered Opposition Platform, for example, is appealing its ban in Ukrainian politics.
Ukraine’s mobilized populace is also actively engaged in determining the country’s future. In one visible example, a petition to remove a statue of Catherine the Great (whose reputation among Ukrainians and Jews is, naturally, not quite positive) in Odesa has gained enough signatures to merit President Zelensky’s attention.
Relatedly, the future that the populace sees is a decidedly Western one, for which treaties such as the Istanbul Convention are being ratified and reforms like the new deoligarchization law are being passed. The latter is already bearing fruit: Ukraine’s wealthiest oligarch and media mogul surrendered his media empire, as a result of which he has ceased being an oligarch in the eyes of the new law.
Recently, Russian officials have been threatening hell to pay if Ukraine continues to resist the “special operation,” with Medvedev promising a “judgment day” if Ukraine even thinks about attacking Crimea. Mykhailo Podolyak responded in a classically effective manner—sarcastically: “What’ll you do? Kill another infant?” On the same day, the anniversary of the shooting down of MH17, Ukrainian officials and outlets drew on the terrorist act and impending judicial resolution as a reminder that no Russian crimes will go unpunished. President Zelensky himself referenced the proceedings in his retort to Medvedev: “There will be a judgment day—for Russia. And not figuratively, but literally.”
Russian Politics and Activity in the Information War
Many commentators expected July 15, when the Duma held an extraordinary congress, to be yet another inflection day for the Kremlin’s decision-making, much like what was expected of May 9. However, like May 9, July 15 proved to be underwhelming and again remedially indicative of the Kremlin’s strategic aimlessness and indecision. The most significant thing that was announced on July 15 was the dismissal of Dmitry Rogozin as head of Roskosmos amid speculation that he will instead assume a high-ranking position within the Kremlin itself. As Mykhailo Podolyak said, “Cheap theater intrigues are the last way to spread dust and hide the fact that the king has been ‘naked’ for a long time.” The Kremlin’s political arsenal is, as always, highly predictable.
Equally predictable and unchanged are Kremlin-aligned media’s efforts in the information war. Themes and strains that were already rusty months ago continue to be deployed today—and continue to signal what disquiets the Kremlin. Below are a few representative strains.
A persistent and hyperbolic strain of the State Weakness and Dysfunction theme is that President Biden is somewhere between his deathbed (political or literal) and a psychiatric ward. To hear Russian media say it, President Biden is “about to impeached,” “senile,” and “a geopolitical failure.” Alongside Russian outlets’ already putting eggs into the Trump basket, the Kremlin’s sympathies in American politics remain unchanged and, again, predictable.
Another State Weakness and Dysfunction strain focuses on the West’s imminent disintegration, which Russian media have been prophesizing since February 24 and also for many years.
Yet another State Weakness and Dysfunction strain is designed to dissuade the West from further supplying Ukraine with weapons: “Ukraine’s fascist leadership is feckless, and Western weapons are being sold on the black market and constantly captured by Russian soldiers in the east.” As Oleksiy Arestovych joked last week, “eight out of four HIMARS in our possession have been destroyed.” Jokes aside, strains like this play into any sudden burst of activity by Western officials who intentionally or inadvertently echo Kremlin talking points, much like Rep. Spartz (R-IN) has done throughout the week. The Kremlin is desperate to capitalize on any sign of discord in the West. To the Kremlin’s dismay, however, Foreign Minister Kuleba said, by all appearances accurately, that Rep. Spartz’s burst of activity has done nothing to harm U.S.-Ukrainian relations.
Speaking of HIMARS: the Provocation theme is also alive and well in Russia’s information space. The West remains at all times a deceitful provocateur who is truly to blame for all the bloodshed. For example, one headline on Lenta flashes across the screen: “Estonia Wants American HIMARS by 2025.” Kremlin-aligned outlets would have the audience believe that this is the height of villainy.
Another persistent State Weakness and Dysfunction strain is meteorological in nature: Russian media love reporting on natural disasters in democracies worldwide as evidence of the democracies’ ill-prepared governments fecklessness. For example: “U.S. Sandstorm Kills at Least 6 in Mass Road Accident.” In concert with other headlines splayed across news outlets’ front pages, articles like this persuade the reader that life outside of Russia is rife with existential dangers and only the Kremlin can keep them at bay.
Much as in Russia’s information space President Biden remains a decrepit old man, Ukraine’s leadership remains a collection of underhanded, blood-bathing warlocks. The Ukrainian Fascist Junta theme remains alive and well, and headlines about Ukraine’s military command are more of the same: “German Journalist Accuses Ukrainian Soldiers of Crimes in Donetsk,” “Reports in LNR of Ukrainian Soldiers Bombing Alchevsk from MLRS HIMARS,” “[Ukrainian] Nationalists Placed Machine Guns and Missile Systems in Residential Houses in Kharkiv,” “Defense Ministry: Ukrainian Armed Forces Shelled Market in Slavyansk to Blame Russia”.
Finally, the Russian Leadership theme has not gone anywhere either. Outlandish headlines such as “Russian Air Forces Eliminated up to 200 Nationalists and Mercenaries in Strike on Deployment Point in Nikolayev” and “Russian Defense Ministry Reports Destruction of Four Command Points of Ukrainian Armed Forces in Single Day with High-Precision Weapons” leave one with the impression that, in order to save precious time, the Kremlin’s propagandists simply take everything that happens to their own forces, then replace “Ukrainian” with “Russian” and vice versa, and send that to press.
Elsewhere in Europe
While the United States has introduced new exceptions to its sanctions against Russia, Ukraine is collaborating with the E.U. on the eighth sanctions package. Germany, meanwhile, has declared that it will stop buying Russian coal by August 1 and oil by December 31.
Elsewhere, in a serious indicator of the Kremlin’s waning strength, Serbia, which is friendly to the Putin regime, declared that it intends to start buying gas from Azerbaijan in 2023. And in Moldova, President Sandu continues straightening her country’s spine by declaring that she “will not sell the country for cheap gas.”
Elsewhere in the World
While Israel intends to provide Ukraine with defensive gear, North Korea has recognized “LNR/DNR,” prompting Ukraine to cut off diplomatic relations.
Meanwhile, against the backdrop of Rep. Spartz’s aforementioned burst of activity and visibility, the West has been assiduously dispelling the notion that Ukraine is an unreliable caretaker of Western weapons. Gen. Zaluzhny and Gen. Milley are in constant contact, and on July 14, the former assured his counterpart that Western weapons will under no circumstances fall into Russian hands. The past week has seen much rhetoric from U.S., E.U., and Ukrainian sources on the subject, vehemently countering the Kremlin-fostered strain that Western weapons are unsafe in Ukraine.