Alexander Rojavin ’20, Law and Public Policy Scholar
Alexander Rojavin is a multilingual intelligence, media, and policy analyst specializing in information warfare. He is currently working on a book on modern Russian cinema as a key battlefield in the Kremlin’s information war. He is also co-chair of the Symposium on Disinformation Studies. In his spare time, he moonlights as a published literary translator (Routledge, Slavica Publishers, forthcoming Academic Studies Press).
What follows is a chronicle of key events, trends, and anomalies from day 170 through day 181 of the Russian-Ukrainian war for democracy.
This report summarizes the military situation across Ukraine, Ukraine’s politics and efforts in the information war, and Russia’s politics and efforts in the information war.
By means of a PSA: if you encounter the word “cotton” in Ukrainian articles these days, be aware that it is a kind of trolling. For months, Russian outlets have been using the word khlopok to denote when there’s an explosion at a Russian target. The thing is, khlopok means “loud clap,” while khlopok means “cotton.” Russian special services used auto-translators several times to try to falsify documents, and Google, being none the wiser, translated it as bavovna into Ukrainian, which means “cotton.” So, since then, Ukrainian articles and officials have been snidely referring to explosions at Russian targets as “cotton.” Here is an example in an Obozrevatel’ headlinefrom August 22: In occupied Crimea, after the “cotton,” they started preparing bomb shelters.
Situation in Ukraine’s South
In Zaporizhzhia Oblast’, Russian forces are at an operational standstill, facing an unyielding Ukrainian frontline and partisans in the backline. By August 13, for example, Ukrainian partisans were up to no good in Melitopol’ for the seventh day in a row. This particular thorn in the Russians’ side has become so acute that Russian forces have begun mass filtration efforts in the region to stymy the partisans. Ukraine’s own counter-intelligence efforts consistently bear fruit—on August 22, it became known that the SBU had exposed a GRU intelligence group in the region that corrected Russian artillery fire.
On August 22, Russian forces again opened mortar fire on the territory of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP), continuing a week-and-a-half-long trend of in-person nuclear brinkmanship. The Russian soldiers’ idiocy amounts to transparent attempted blackmail intended to frighten the West and coerce Ukraine to negotiate from a position of fear—neither a likely outcome. (More on how the ZNPP is figuring in the information war below).
In occupied Kherson, facing the impending Ukrainian liberation force, Russian soldiers have been abducting locals with increased aggressiveness and frequency. Ukrainian forces, meanwhile, have continued disrupting Russian logistics in the region. The movement of the Russian forces is almost entirely under Ukrainian artillery fire control.
The last two weeks have also seen the Ukrainian oblast’ of Crimea join the list of active battlefields. Following the first major strike against a Russian military airbase in Crimea, there have regularly been explosions over Crimean airspace, as Russian air defense systems have been mobilized: on August 18 and August 19, for example, Russian air defenses eliminated airborne targets, as Russian officials in the area tried to play it cool, saying that “our air defenses are working.” (In fact, this may likely soon become another meme, with Ukrainian commentators snidely saying that “Russian air defense is hard at work” any time faraway Russian targets are under fire). Nevertheless, the façade of Crimea’s impregnability is swiftly cracking: there has been a spike in traffic across the Crimean Bridge (away from Crimea into Russia, naturally), and Russians in area have been checking bomb shelters to ensure they are operable. Six months later, Russia’s strategic fortunes have never been on as clear display: rather than capturing Lviv in 72 hours, the Kremlin junta crouches beneath the specter of liberation that hangs over occupied Crimea.
Situation in Ukraine’s East
Every morning begins with Russian and Ukrainian headlines disagreeing about the situation in the east. Ukrainian headlines generally follow the General Staff’s briefings, which result in some variation on “The adversary tried to advance in 6–14 directions and found no success.” An example from August 19: During Attempts to Attack in Ukraine’s South and East, Occupants Suffered Losses and Were Repulsed. Russian headlines, meanwhile, those same six months later, are trying with doubled and tripled fury to spin marginal tactical successes into operational achievements—sometimes several times in a row, as with the Ukrainian settlement of Peski, Donestk Oblast’, which Russian headlines have intermittently declared captured and captured again and captured some more over the past two weeks, much as they did with Lysychansk and Severodonetsk before Peski and myriad other settlements before them (and all of Luhansk Oblast’, which Russian forces still have not entirely captured). (It would, by the way, be more accurate to say that Peski simply do not exist as a coherent settlement anymore, since Russian forces have obliterated swaths of the Donetsk suburb rather than capturing it).
In Luhansk Oblast’, Russian forces have still been unable to secure the entire region. And Ukrainian forces are not sitting quietly: on August 14, a Wagner base accidentally given away by a Russian propagandist was destroyed in Popasna, and on August 16, another base was destroyed in Lysychansk. (Speaking of the Wagnerites, nearly all the prisoners contracted by Wagner to fight in Ukraine have been killed). Roughly 350,000 Ukrainian citizens remain in the occupied parts of Luhansk Oblast’, and many are being “mobilized” to as cannon fodder.
As previously, Kharkiv remains under Russian artillery fire. On August 18, for instance, a particularly cruel Russian strike killed at least twelve civilians.
Ukrainian Politics and Activity in the Information War
On August 22, General Zaluzhny finally revealed an approximation of Ukraine’s total losses in the war: ~9,000 soldiers. Per the official Ukrainian count, over 45,000 Russian soldiers have perished (not including mercenaries and those mobilized in occupied territories, which would add tens of thousands of bodies to the count). It was always known that Ukraine’s losses are significantly lower than Russia’s, and having this number out in the open, while certainly not cause for celebration, does lend itself to a grim steeling of self as Ukraine sees this war through.
With Ukrainian Independence Day on Wednesday, August 24, officials and the military are making preparations for intensified Russian terrorism this week, especially on Independence Day itself. This is happening as Russian forces have increased their naval presence in the Black Sea. It is also happening against the backdrop of an established trend of Russian soldiers’ indiscriminate manner in firing missiles—per the SBU, only one out of every twenty Russian missiles has struck a military target throughout the war.
With their countrymen’s transgressions fueling their will, the Free Russia Legion’s ranks have been noticeably growing, as new divisions continue to be formed.
While most Ukrainian strategists think it unlikely that Russian forces will intentionally commit suicide detonating the ZNPP, Ukrainian officials are nevertheless strategically working the ZNPP situation into the broader narrative about Russia as a terrorist state—and this strategy has been bearing fruit, as Latvia’s parliament recognized Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism on August 11. Now, while an intentional massive explosion is unlikely, we are talking about the people who willingly spent over a month digging trenches in the Red Forest near Chernobyl, so awareness and carefulness are not their strong suit.
Ukraine has also continued to develop the narrative that it would be a reliable and viable alternative energy partner for Europe in Russia’s stead, a campaign that, if successful, will simultaneously further hamstring Russia’s economic while fortifying Ukraine’s course as an economic lynchpin of the West.
In the meantime, President Zelensky and Foreign Minister Kuleba continue to enact their diplomatic and information strategy regarding various African nations. On August 10, President Zelensky had a conversation with Ghanan President Nana Akufo-Addo—the first in the history of bilateral Ukrainian-Ghanan relations. On August 15, President Zelensky spoke with President Mohamed Bazoum of Niger—also the first such high-level dialogue between the two countries. And on August 16, he spoke with President Hakainde Hichilema of Zambia. Foreign Minister Kuleba, meanwhile, has an Africa tour scheduled, during which he will buttress and expand on President Zelensky’s opening efforts.
On August 16, a new documentary by Ukrainskaya pravda dropped and disrupted Ukraine’s information space with investigative coverage of what the film derisively dubbed the “Monaco Battalion”—Ukrainian “VIP refugees” who fled for the Azure Coast and have spent the war relaxing in the sun. The film prompted an announcement by the SBU a day later that it will investigate whether the “Battalion’s” crossing of the state border was legal. Every flock has its black sheep—no nation is an exception.
Alongside Ukraine’s aforementioned major information campaigns, Ukrainian officials are also engaged in a concerted effort to convince the West to stop handing out tourist visas to Russians. On August 14, Mykhailo Podolyak succinctly explained the need for such a ban: it would be “the first step towards a Russian rebellion.” The effort is again running into opposition from Western politicians with a desire to maintain a semblance of “business as usual,” including in Portugal, Cyprus, and Greece. Support is nevertheless mounting, as traditional allies like the Baltic States support the ban, and even Denmark and major political factions in Germany are rallying behind the idea. Pushing such a ban through would be a major diplomatic victory for Ukraine and would precipitously hasten the Kremlin junta’s demise as more Russians’ creature comforts would be constricted.
Russian Politics and Activity in the Information War
Across and near the Russian Federation, news has been surfacing the past two weeks that has been unlikely to cause the Kremlin much comfort. Conscription centers and other buildings continue to burn across the country, with a barracks in Moscow Oblast’ catching fire on August 11. On August 12, it became known that Kazakhstan would begin supplying oil through Azerbaijan, cutting Russia out of the logistical chain. And per a new poll, Russian federal TV channels are bleeding nearly a quarter of their audiences, having replaced nearly all of their programming with “special operation”-related content.
On August 20, Russian ideologue Aleksandr Dugin’s daughter Darya Dugina perished in a car explosion. Mykhailo Podolyak (unironically) said that the Ukraine had nothing to do with it, head of Ukraine’s NSC Sergei Danilov claimed that it was the FSB, and Russian partisans have assumed responsibility for killing her. This bears some significance for the Kremlin’s internal politics (one op-ed reasonably argues that it was the result of Russian palace intrigues), but Western media casts Dugin as much more important than he has ever actually been—it was incongruous to see Dugin’s headshot on the front page of The Washington Post. As Ukrainian journalist Yuri Butusov writes, “The explosion of a little-known Russian propagandist will be used by the Russian regime to create the myth of Ukrainian terrorism.” On August 22, the FSB indeed accused Ukraine of killing Dugina, prompting an intensification of the Ukrainian Fascist Junta meta-narrative. This was predictable, and it is important to remember: the most frightening thing from the Kremlin’s perspective is internal unrest, domestic stirrings that could lead to revolution. Consequently, the Kremlin cannot acknowledge that Dugina was killed by Russian partisans (though the Kremlin could admit it was another Russian for the sake of eliminating political opponents from another faction). Either way, the Kremlin will now use her death as a rallying cry—especially ahead of a show tribunal the Kremlin is preparing for captured members of the Azov Battalion.
Western Media
Media in the West have still been unable to wean themselves off the habit of framing Russia and the Kremlin as being in the driver’s seat. For the next two paragraphs, The Washington Post will be the target of my disaffection. Russia Blames Ukraine for Explosion that Killed Putin Ally’s Daughter, proclaims a Washington Post headline from August 22, referencing the death of Darya Dugina. What is the average reader, with limited knowledge of the war and Russian and/or Ukrainian history, politics, and culture supposed to take away from this headline? Syntactically, the headline imparts into the reader’s mind the impression that Russia is the one doing something. Russia blames Ukraine; then a headline just below adds: Putin Ally Dugin Calls for “More than Just Revenge” after Daughter’s Killing. Also in the mix: Excerpts from a Russian Soldier’s Journal: “I Will Not Participate in this Madness”. It is only ever Russians, Russia, Putin, Dugin, the Kremlin who are engaging in active verbs.
Well, perhaps not: after all, the previous week was dedicated to a series of articles about how President Zelensky failed to warn Ukrainians that the war was impending. “Fail” is an active verb. I was under the impression that we had already dealt with that bit of nonsense—indeed, if Ukraine had not been preparing for the war, then why did the Zelensky administration call for crippling preemptive sanctions against Russia and the heavy weaponry that it only began receiving after holding out for months without it, at the cost of tens of thousands of civilian lives—but apparently, the media’s memories are short. Or else the desire for sensational headlines driving clicks is simply too powerful, reckless disregard for the truth be damned.
Concluding Thoughts
The West is currently paying the price for spending 22 years fostering a monster—what’s worse is the monster never even hid that it was a monster. The instant that Putin said “It sank” regarding the Kursk in 2000, the West should have understood that Bucha and Mariupol’ and Aleppo were the only logical continuation of his reign, should it continue. It continued. The West was lulled and lulled itself into political, economic, and informational complacency, allowing an ossified, senile dictatorship to throw its weight around the globe for the better part of two decades.
Now the West must play clean-up while Ukraine pays the butcher’s bill. The way forward is through informed, competent, decisive, and visionary technocratic leadership that embraces that there are right and wrong in this world—and that the concepts of right and wrong belong in geopolitics.
Tomorrow is Ukraine’s Independence Day. Ukrainians are dying to ensure the freedom not only of Ukraine, but of the entire West, and of Russia itself. We must all play our parts to ensure that next year’s Independence Day is celebrated freely and openly across all 25 Ukrainian oblast’s—including Donetsk, Kherson, Crimea, and Luhansk.