Alexander Rojavin ’20, Law and Public Policy Scholar
Alexander Rojavin is a multilingual intelligence, media, and policy analyst specializing in information warfare. He is currently working on a book on modern Russian cinema as a key battlefield in the Kremlin’s information war. He is also co-chair of the Symposium on Disinformation Studies. In his spare time, he moonlights as a published literary translator (Routledge, Slavica Publishers, forthcoming Academic Studies Press).
What follows is a chronicle of key events, trends, and anomalies from day 196 through day 203 of the Russian-Ukrainian war for democracy.
This report summarizes the military situation across Ukraine, Ukraine’s politics and efforts in the information war, and Russia’s politics and efforts in the information war.
As suspected, Ukraine’s attention-hogging offensive in the south, while being a legitimate offensive in its own right, was also a distraction that fixed the Kremlin’s gaze there, forcing improper Russian rotations and allowing Ukrainian forces to launch an offensive in the east, primarily in Kharkiv Oblast’, with activity now spilling over into Luhansk and Donetsk oblast’s. Consequently, most of Kharkiv Oblast’ has been liberated, with Ukrainian forces having secured almost the entire Russian-Ukrainian border in the region.
Situation in Ukraine’s South
While Russian forces are being routed in the east, their resistance in the south is wearing down also.
On September 12, southern command’s press secretary Natalya Gumenyuk confirmed that 500 square kilometers had been liberated (and ~1,800 Russian soldiers slain) and named five liberated villages: Vysokopillya, Novovoznesen’ske, Bilogirka, Myrolyubivka, and Sukhyi Stavok. The actual number of liberated settlements is much higher, but Ukrainian officials continue to confirm liberations on a delay, and even OSINTers are heeding the Defense Ministry’s plea to restrain themselves.
Nevertheless, reports have been coming in all week of Russian troops fleeing in several directions near Kherson, concentrations of Russian forces and equipment being destroyed from afar, and Russian soldiers and commanders offering to lay down their arms and surrender. Russian forces have also abandoned attempts to restore the Antoniv Bridge. Large quantities of equipment are being abandoned or destroyed, including aircraft—both planes and helicopters. On September 7, two Su-25s were shot down, at least one in Kharkiv Oblast’. On September 11, video surfaced of another Su-25 dropping out of the sky over Crimea.
Partisan activity across the south continues as well, with the most visible activity in Melitopol’. On September 7, for instance, the headquarters of the Kremlin’s party apparatus in the city exploded.
On September 11, it also became known that the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has completely shut down.
Situation in Ukraine’s East
Ukraine has restored control over most of Kharkiv Oblast’. The announced offensive in the south on August 29 served its purpose, forcing the Russian military out of position and inconceivably lowering its guard in the east. On September 6, Ukrainian forces struck, surrounding Balakliya. The city was soon liberated (though President Zelensky would officially proclaim it so only two days later on September 8). The next day, Kupyansk’s mayor cautioned locals to prepare for Ukrainian forces to be there soon. By this point, the Russian front line, lacking a second, to say nothing of a third, line of defense, crumbled. A lieutenant-general (originally mistaken for a lieutenant-colonel) was captured on the first day of the eastern push. Russian mercenary units in the area suffered 40% loss rates. The 237th Paratrooper Regiment was eliminated in its entirety.
By September 8, while also enjoying tactical gains in Luhansk and Donetsk oblast’s, Ukrainian forces had liberated over 20 settlements and recaptured 400 square kilometers in Kharkiv Oblast’—out of a total of 1,000 square kilometers recaptured along the entire front since September 1. On September 9, Kupyansk was surrounded by Ukrainian troops, and Russian sources alleged that Izyum was under attack (Ukrainian outlets maintained discipline). A delighted Oleksiy Arestovych showed up for his daily chat with Mark Feygin and announced, “Mark, we have a massive problem. “Oh?” “Yes. We have nowhere to put new POWs.” On September 10, headlines pronounced Kupyansk and Izyum liberated; Russian forces were in a full retreat in Kharkiv Oblast’. Moreover, Donetsk Oblast’ was getting interesting also, as reports surfaced that Ukrainian forces had entered the Donetsk airport (originally lost in 2014).
On September 11, though not reported by Ukrainian media, Ukrainian OSINTers asserted that battles were ongoing in Rubizhne, Lysychansk, and Severodonetsk, which are still shown a ways away from the frontline on most maps. Moreover, something appeared to be brewing in the direction of Vugledar. In Luhansk Oblast’, a few settlements were also liberated, with Governor Gaidai asserting that “we’re working on Lysychansk” and Russian soldiers fleeing from settlements originally captured in 2014. At the same time, streams of liberated towns and villages in Kharkiv Oblast’ were being reported, while the morning briefing by Russia’s Defense Ministry’s spokesman Konashenkov featured a map showing all of northern Kharkiv Oblast’ under Ukrainian control.
By September 12, that state of affairs came to pass: all of Kharkiv Oblast’ west of the Oskil River was under Ukrainian control, with Ukrainian forces securing the Russian-Ukrainian border in the region.
In the night of September 12, an oil depot exploded in Belgorod, prompting the usual snide Ukrainian comments about smoking in the wrong place.
On September 13, Russian forces had retreated from Kreminna, as pressure on Lysychansk and Severodonetsk mounted. On September 14, however, they had reappeared in town—the liberation of Luhansk Oblast’ will not be as sudden.
For an analysis of the Kremlin’s information response to last week’s events in eastern Ukraine, see the section below on Russia’s activity in the information war.
Ukrainian Politics and Activity in the Information War
Though military developments are currently meriting the lion’s share of attention, the information war and Ukraine’s political and diplomatic pursuits have not subsided. While Ukraine’s armed forces liberate swaths of the country in the east and south, it is important to remember that Ukraine’s political leadership is repeatedly demonstrating that it has a strategic vision for what to do with those swaths—and the country as a whole.
The administration understands that liberating the occupied territories is not enough—particularly those that have been occupied since 2014. To this end, for instance, Deputy Prime Minister for the Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territory Iryna Vereshchuk (a position whose existence indicates this as a distinct area of concern for the administration) has spent months coordinating prisoner exchanges and humanitarian efforts targeting territories not under Ukrainian control, serving both a humanitarian goal and an information goal—showing those under Russian rule, especially in the “DNR” and “LNR,” the difference between Kyiv’s and Moscow’s care for its charges’ welfare. A more vivid example is the Crimean Platform, whose purpose is to provide a pluralistic, inclusive forum to inform Ukraine’s reintegration policy regarding the peninsula.
Ukraine has also not lost sight of its eventual integration into the E.U., calmly passing democratic reforms despite being in a state of war. On September 11, Prime Minister Shmyhal signaled that Ukraine will need a maximum of two years to deliver all of its promised reforms for E.U. integration.
Ukrainian diplomats are also continually rallying tangible international support through the Ramstein conferences, the fifth of which has prompted Arestovych to tease his and Feygin’s viewers with the promise of significant commitments from Ukraine’s allies.
Ukraine’s leadership is also clear-eyed about what it will not accept, which should come as news to no one, as Ukrainian officials have been explaining their victory conditions since the war’s first days. No Minsk Agreement. Nothing even remotely resembling the Budapest Memorandum. Only an enforceable, weighty international security accord.
And Ukraine is maintaining pressure in the information war, targeting Russians themselves: Ukrainian hackers have been active the last two weeks, disrupting myriad Russian resources and even broadcasting President Zelensky’s daily address to Crimeans. Moreover, President Zelensky is continuing his diplomatic campaign to undo Russian and Chinese influence in Africa—on September 8, he spoke with the newly elected President Ruto of Kenya, marking the first bilateral conversation between the two nations.
It is also worth noting that following the recent change in Western coverage about how the war—“Wowowow, the Ukrainians are counter-advancing, who woulda thunk???”—there has been a slight uptick in sober-minded commentators’ reminding the audience that Russia will not be able to liberalize properly until it disintegrates and no longer exists within the borders it currently occupies. Only reduced, coherent, historically defeated, and with wildly new leadership that understands the complexities of trying to evolve civilizational archetypes will it be able to democratize.
Ukrainians feel like this war has presented them with an opportunity to awaken and rally the democratic world. Despite being treated at times by the West as anything from an unruly, not-very-smart child to a leper, much of Ukraine has always genuinely believed in the promise, power, and primacy of an international democratic civilization. Now that it has been forced to pay for its beliefs with lives of tens of thousands of its citizens, Ukraine’s leadership is unlikely to let the chance to enact its vision slip away…
Russian Activity in the Information War
…As opposed to the Kremlin, which is plagued, as ever, by the same strategic inertia that it has been unable to overcome for years. The Kremlin’s paralysis and indecision in the face of the eastern offensive are once again indicative of the junta’s reactionary manner of waging information warfare.
When the offensive was already underway on September 7, Russian news media’s first reaction was typical: report on everything under the sun other than the Ukrainian offensive. As with a dinosaur, if you pretend it’s not there, it will go away. Rabid Russian OSINTers, however, were perfectly aware that Balakliya and other occupied towns were already forfeit, and their ire quickly turned on the Kremlin. Official outlets soon began acknowledging that the offensive existed, but had already been countered. Then, it turned out that the situation was more unpleasant than originally reported, even though caravans of ambulances were sweeping behind the Ukrainian cutthroats to clean up their own dead, and four thousand Ukrainians had been slain in four days. Finally, on September 10, Konashenkov made the claim that Russia had decided to “regroup” (the evolved version of “gesture of good will”), with a map behind him showing most of Kharkiv Oblast’ under Ukrainian control. By September 11, headlines began popping up in Russia’s information space about mounting Ukrainian attacks in Donetsk Oblast’. Naturally, the Kremlin is relying on its usual defense (“We’re fighting against all of NATO, not just a few ill-armed Ukrainians!”), but as these headlines become less rare, more and more Russians will begin scratching their heads as to why the ever-victorious Russian army is yet again narrowing its objectives. Already, the Kremlin is struggling to send new units to the front on account of refusals to fight.
Indeed, saplings of boldness are growing in Russia: after some municipal legislators in St. Petersburg drafted a proposal to remove Putin on treason charges and sent it to the Duma, they were summarily arrested and charged with discrediting the army on September 9. This instance should not be over-analyzed: it may be indicative of mounting boldness among the populace; it may be just a blip. For now, it should be treated as a peculiar data point and remembered in future analyses.
On September 13, a curious thing happened: Gennady Zyuganov, head of the Russian Communists, declared that Russians need to acclimate to the thought that there is a war (he used the word “war”) going on, and that a general mobilization may be in the cards. Much like the dead Zhirinovsky, Zyuganov is a faithful Kremlin lapdog—he does not speak unless ordered to. This is likely a trial balloon by the Kremlin to take people’s temperature regarding a general mobilization, which, if announced, would be another bit of weight for the camel’s back.