Alexander Rojavin ’20, Law and Public Policy Scholar
Alexander Rojavin is a multilingual intelligence, media, and policy analyst specializing in information warfare. He is currently working on a book on modern Russian cinema as a key battlefield in the Kremlin’s information war. He is also co-chair of the Symposium on Disinformation Studies. In his spare time, he moonlights as a published literary translator (Routledge, Slavica Publishers, forthcoming Academic Studies Press).
What follows is a chronicle of key events and trends on the information battlefield from day 114 through day 123 of the Russian-Ukrainian war for democracy.
This report brings readers’ attention to some of key moments and issues from this period of the war, during which Ukrainian forces finally withdrew for Severodonetsk while making gains in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblast’s.
Contours of the West’s Win Condition
In a happy coincidence, after my previous report’s dissection of the West’s dithering, Western rhetoric sharply crystallized. Following the visit to Ukraine by President Macron, Chancellor Scholz, Prime Minister Draghi, and President Iohannis, Western officials one after another sober-mindedly delineated how this war will end: with Ukraine’s victory, the Putin regime’s defeat, and whatever conditions that Ukraine’s popular will dictates—and it will be the popular will, since Ukrainians have repeatedly demonstrated over the last decades that they will settle for nothing less.
This is a welcome sign. It has already been documented that peoples’ outlook changes when they come face-to-face with the war’s brutal consequences in Bucha and Irpin’, and these leaders were no exception. Even if they headed to Ukraine intending to convince/coerce/implore President Zelensky to tone down his rhetoric, following their visit to Kyiv’s suburbs, they are the ones whose rhetoric changed—and for the better. The shift, of course, was followed by the European Union’s acceptance of Moldova’s and Ukraine’s candidacies for E.U. membership—a superlative political achievement that will yield tangible, beneficial results for all the world’s democracies.
Perhaps the best illustration of the restored, confident Western contours is this: Defense Minister Reznikov revealed that at Ramstein, he said that “Ukraine is a de facto member of NATO, protecting the eastern flank,” and the other defense ministers agreed. Moreover, Secretary of Defense Austin said that the West will be with Ukraine “until Russia’s defeat and Ukraine’s victory.” If this rhetoric is maintained, then we will be able to say that the West is finally finding its voice anew.
Situation in Ukraine’s South
Ukrainian forces have the initiative in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblast’s.
Ukrainian partisans smell blood in the air and have been growing bolder. Among the highlights are two instances near Melitopol’ and in Kherson. Near occupied Melitopol’, where it is common knowledge that the Russians are robbing local farmers blind, one group of farmers prepared some chemically treated cherries. The Russians stole them and were all poisoned. Meanwhile, a trio of FSB agents went into a restaurant in occupied Kherson, where they behaved themselves rather rowdily. In the middle of their rabblerousing, a group of Ukrainian partisans arrived and gunned them down, marking the increased confidence with which such partisan cells are operating on temporarily occupied territories.
On a broader scale, Ukrainian forces have broken through the first line of Russian defense in Kherson Oblast’ and now have the city of Kherson literally in their sights, as they are some 15 kilometers away from the regional center. It also appears that Ukraine may have deployed the supplied HIMARS for the first time in a strike against a drilling rig in the Black Sea, after which the Kremlin threatened retaliatory strikes against Kyiv—a threat on which the Russians followed through on June 26th, when they fired missiles into Ukraine’s capital.
Increasingly cratering morale and frustration among Russia’s forces continue to bear other fruit as well: in Zaporizhzhia Oblast’, a group of Chechens and a group of Buryats, who have not been getting along throughout this invasion, again opened fire on one another. There are also numerous reports of Russian troops refusing to execute orders. In Zaporizhzhia Oblast’, one report showed that a group of 60 Russians deserted all at once, while a separate intercepted phone call revealed that 80 others had deserted elsewhere, showing that these are not isolated incidents.
Enraged by Ukraine’s success in the south, Russian troops have been responding by shelling various civilian targets (across the entire country) in retaliation, including strikes against Odesa Oblast’ and Mykolaiv Oblast’.
News also surfaced that a rogue SBU officer betrayed to the Russians the location of the Ukrainian minefields in Kherson Oblast’, as a result of which Russian troops managed to circumvent them. By all appearances, however, they did not demine them, meaning that they will again be a factor once Russian forces are kicked out of Kherson and back to the south and east.
Situation in Ukraine’s East
Ukrainian forces finally withdrew from Severodonetsk, relocating the brunt of their defensive operation to Lysychansk. Heading off panicked (especially Western) commentary that this signified a major defeat for Ukraine, clear-headed Ukrainian military analyst Oleg Zhdanov explained that the Ukrainian defense of the city had fulfilled its objective of massively delaying and bleeding the Russian army. Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine Oleksiy Arestovych separately followed up on Zhdanov’s analysis, saying that Russia still has barely any chance of conquering all of Donetsk Oblast’, and, despite the retreat from Severodonetsk, even Russia’s ability to take all of Lugansk Oblast’ is under question.
The withdrawal was balanced by other successful Ukrainian strikes, including in the northeast, where Ukrainian air forces hit Russian logistics and repair centers.
Moreover, the Ukrainians’ withdrawal represents a historical break with a century-old military paradigm. The Soviet approach to major defensive operations was nearly always “defend heroically to the last man.” The city (or other strategic point) is lost, but everyone dies a hero. Everyone dies a hero, but the city is lost. Ukraine’s (temporary) withdrawal from Severodonetsk is a culture-defining break with this paradigm and yet another indicator of the country’s military leadership’s strategic vision and willpower.
Per Arestovych, Ukraine’s artillery presence in Lugansk Oblast’ has been reinforced (as it has across much of the front), and it instantly began to bear fruit over the last weeks, including seven successful strikes against large Russian ammo depots between June 16th and June 18th. As Arestovych keeps saying, when the Ukrainian forces have the artillery they need, they waste no time in cleaning up.
In Kharkiv Oblast’, Russian forces have drawn a little nearer the city itself, and have renewed their shelling of the regional center.
Elsewhere in Ukraine
Russian forces continue vengefully shelling military and civilian targets across the rest of Ukraine. In Rivne, missiles struck civilian infrastructure on June 25th. In Mykolaiv, Russian missiles damaged residential areas and an educational institution. In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast’, missiles have been falling across the entire region. On June 26th, two Russian missiles landed near Cherkassy, the capital of the eponymous oblast’. And also on June 26th, several missiles flew towards Kyiv itself, and while some were shot down, at least one missile connected with a residential skyrise, claiming one life and maiming several others.
Ukraine’s security services, however, are systematically neutralizing network after network of Russian agents, including one that was supplying Ukrainian soldiers with illicit drugs. The SBU announced a big public victory on June 17th, when it revealed that a nationwide network of 19 Russian agents had been neutralized. Then, on June 21st, it was revealed that the SBU neutralized more Russian agents among the Cabinet of Ministers and the Chamber of Commerce.
Ukrainian Politics
Over the past two weeks, the Rada adopted a slew of initiatives to weaken Russia’s cultural influence over the country. These initiatives included a ban on the import of literature published in Russia and Belarus, a bill supporting domestic literary production, and a new list of recommendations for the Ministry of Education on curricular reform. Naturally, Russian media were in an uproar about it, but the Kremlin’s disquiet regarding the (at the time) impending E.U. decision on accepting Ukraine as a candidate for membership ate up most of the oxygen in Russia’s information space (see below).
Ukraine in the Information War
While Ukraine continues to exploit chinks in the imperfect digital carapace of Russia’s information space, Ukraine’s attention in the information war is turned primarily to its Western audiences and criticism of what more and more Ukrainian outlets are labeling “old Europe” (here is one op-ed employing such language) as manifested in European officials who are implying or explicitly calling for a return to “business as usual” with Kremlin.
Encouraged by achieving candidacy for E.U. membership, Ukraine redoubled its already concentrated efforts to implement stricter sanctions and procure more heavy weapons from its Western allies, resulting in Slovakia, the United Kingdom, and France separately committing to supplying new batches of equipment. In light of Ukraine’s redoubled efforts, the Pentagon published a list of everything that has so far been sent to Ukraine. On June 21st, Defense Minister Reznikov announced that the first party of German Panzerhaubitze 2000 arrived in Ukraine.
Ukraine is also devoting some attention to the aggressor state. For example, Ukrainian intelligence trolled the Kremlin by publishing the technical documentation of the Crimean Bridge, implying that Ukraine is well aware of all of the bridge’s weak points and will not hesitate to strike at them when the time comes. Also per Arestovych, recruiting for the Free Russia Legion is suddenly spiking.
After Ukraine’s forces withdrew from Severodonetsk, Deputy Defense Minister had a few harsh words for civilians who preemptively reported on the withdrawal, as it ruined some of the Ukrainians’ plans—a cost that Ukraine’s government decided it would accept in exchange for not implementing wartime censorship as a democracy. Meanwhile, as soon as the Russian forces assumed control of the city, they appointed a municipal administrator and immediately began filming propaganda videos with the civilians who had been stuck and traumatized in the Azot plant.
At the same time, the E.U. accepted Ukraine as a candidate for E.U. membership. Placing the development in the typical logocentric framework, President Zelensky again drew on Lord of the Rings to say that Ukraine is no longer an unaffiliated “border between orcs and elves,” but “a future member of the E.U.”
Russia in the Information War
There is very little new or innovative in Russia’s information space or in the Kremlin’s moves in the information war. Kremlin-aligned outlets are rapid-firing strain after strain designed to convince readers and viewers that the E.U. is about to disintegrate, that it will never accept Ukraine, that it will accept Ukraine and immediately disintegrate, that accepting Ukraine will take decades, that it will accept Ukraine only for Ukraine to summon demons and rain hellfire on the entire continent, etc., etc., etc. As always, the particulars of Russian media’s strains are unimportant—only the trends interest us, and the trends clearly betray the Kremlin’s mounting panic over two things: Ukraine’s accelerating Euro-integration and the deployment of Western heavy weapons. These two things have even somewhat lessened Kremlin-aligned outlets’ coverage of Western sanctions—though it is certainly still happening.
As Parlamentskaya gazeta reported on June 17th, Putin declared that Russia “has nothing against Ukraine’s accession to the E.U.” Meaning that on the list of the Putin regime’s fears, Ukraine’s accession to the E.U. is among the leading ones.
Elsewhere in Post-Soviet Space
Rhetoric between the Kremlin and Lithuania has been gaining heat, with the Putin regime threatening Vilnius following Lithuania’s ban on the transport of goods between the Russian mainland and Kaliningrad. Lithuania is standing its ground, however, unfazed by the Kremlin’s threats. A little over a week earlier, the Duma introduced a bill annulling Russia’s recognition of Lithuania’s independence, which marked the previous spike in Russian-Lithuanian enmity.
Following the European Commission’s recommendation to give Moldova and Ukraine but not Georgia the status of candidate for membership, mass protests took place in Georgia, where Shota Digmelashvili, a leading member of former West-aligned President Saakashvili’s party, was among the organizers. He promised another wave of protests on the 24th and came through on his promise. Georgians are voicing more and more dissatisfaction with the country’s current Kremlin-controlled leadership. In a sign of the regime’s displeasure and disquiet, the current speaker of the parliament described what the protesters want as “another Maidan”—meaning it, of course, as a bad thing.
On June 19th, in a big slap to the face, a sign of Russia’s weakness, and a sign of Kazakhstan’s mounting boldness, President Tokayev thanked Moscow for helping quell the uprising early in the year and then calmly stated that Kazakhstan does not recognize LNR or DNR. Moreover, he refused to accept the Order of Alexander Nevsky. Kazakhstan is steadily asserting more and more of its dominance and is positioning itself well a potential regional hegemon following Russia’s defeat.
Finally, Maia Sandu has signed into law a bill forbidding the retranslation of Russian political programming.
Elsewhere in Europe
The war has caused a major fracture in one of Italy’s four leading political powers: Italy’s Foreign Minister Luigi di Maio and a number of other MPs announced their split from the incoherent, populist, ostensibly leftist Five Star Movement because of party leader and former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s mounting reticence to supply Ukraine with military aid. Di Maio intends to begin a new party that will side with Prime Minister Draghi in his support of Ukraine.
Concluding Thoughts
I have written before on the infectiousness of democracy and the culture of democracy. Events across the world are illustrating the relevance of that argument (let’s put an asterisk next to the recent string of seismic elections and resulting events across western South America).
At the risk of sounding like an echo of an echo of a parrot of an echo, the West must decisively and precisely invest in its information and cultural warfare capabilities, creating reliable talent pipelines, incorporating specialists from the humanities into decision-making processes, and developing regional, language, and cultural expertise—including foreign media literacy—among its psyops forces.