Alexander Rojavin ’20, Law and Public Policy Scholar
Alexander Rojavin is a multilingual intelligence, media, and policy analyst specializing in information warfare. He is currently working on a book on modern Russian cinema as a key battlefield in the Kremlin’s information war. He is also co-chair of the Symposium on Disinformation Studies. In his spare time, he moonlights as a published literary translator (Routledge, Slavica Publishers, forthcoming Academic Studies Press).
What follows is a chronicle of key events, trends, and anomalies from day 147 through day 161 of the Russian-Ukrainian war for democracy.
This report summarizes the military situation across Ukraine, Ukraine’s politics and efforts in the information war, Russia’s politics and efforts in the information war, and related developments in Europe and elsewhere in the world.
As other flashpoints crop up around the world, August nevertheless promises to be a critical month in the war, with Kherson squarely in the Ukrainian forces’ sights, and the information war getting more and more out of the Kremlin’s control.
Situation in Ukraine’s South
Among the most important operational achievements on the southern front was the Ukrainian forces’ critical strike against the Antonovsky Bridge, which was the Russian forces’ main logistical artery in the region. Together with the destruction of a nearby rail bridge, Russian logistics in the area have been fundamentally disrupted—and this is as Ukrainian forces routinely conduct surgical strikes against targets in the area, including Russian ammo depots, and liberate key settlements en route to the city of Kherson itself (53 settlements in total have been liberated as of August 2). Russian forces are now trying to ferry their equipment across the river. Ukrainian military analysts like Oleg Zhdanov had been calling for this strike for weeks. Ukrainian officials are making no secret about Kherson’s being in their sights and have been explicitly issuing warnings to the Russians occupying the region—following up on predictions by multiple analysts that Kherson will be liberated by August’s end. Relatedly, posters trolling the Russians have cropped up all over Kherson, saying “Ukrainian armed forces are like watermelon season—on the way.” Mark Feygin, commenting on the subject, stated that the Kremlin, as at most other times in this war, has no proactive strategy for what to do after Kherson is liberated.
In response to Ukrainian advances in the region, the Kremlin has been rotating troops from the eastern front to Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblast’s, attempting to shore up weak spots in oblast’s in which they are steadily losing ground; in Zaporizhzhia Oblast’, for example, Ukrainian shelling forced the Russians to retreat from Verkhniy Tokmak and Chernihivka. As of August 2, the Russians have amassed some 22,000 troops on the southern front to try to stem the Ukrainian counter-offensive. Indeed, the ISW has separately concluded that the Russians are no longer able to proceed with their advance towards Slovyansk because of the number of forces they have rotated to the southern front. Russian forces have also continued marauding the countryside—in Kherson Oblast’, nearly ~200 hectares of crops are being destroyed daily—and are ceaselessly bombing the closest large cities under Ukrainian control; namely, Nikopol’ (where several civilians have perished and dozens have been injured) and Mykolaiv (which suffered a record amount of shelling on July 31) remain under heavy fire. In what was likely a targeted strike, a Russian missile killed Ukrainian agricultural oligarch Oleksiy Vadatursky on July 31, prompting Mykhailo Podolyak to assess that it was probably an intentional hit, as the Kremlin seeks both to keep sowing terror and to strike at Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure, be it human or technical.
Situation in Ukraine’s East
On the eastern front, where Russian forces have still been unable to capture all of Luhansk Oblast’, a new flashpoint took place on July 29: the Russians blew up a POW camp in occupied Olenivka, Donetsk Oblast’. 50 Ukrainian POWs perished. Motives for the act aside from zombified savagery may have been to hide evidence of torture and to hide the embezzlement of funds set aside for prisoner maintenance. After the explosion, the Russians denied the Red Cross access to the site. Satellite images soon emerged indicating that graves were dug for the POWs before the explosion took place, again pointing to the explosion’s intentionality.
Meanwhile, as Ukrainian forces hold positions in Luhansk and Donetsk oblast’s, the Russians continue to kill civilians. On July 28, eight people died and nineteen were injured in Donetsk Oblast’. On July 30, six civilians perished under Russian missiles. On July 31, three more were killed. In response to the bombings and in preparation for the upcoming winter, Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk announced that Ukraine is planning to evacuate over 200,000 inhabitants from the parts of Donetsk Oblast’ that are under Ukrainian control. This will also make it easier both to defend and subsequently counter-advance in the region.
Elsewhere in Ukraine
Russian rockets do not discriminate by region and continue to fall across many of Ukraine’s 25 oblast’s. On July 28, Russian forces shelled Kropyvnytskyi, Kirovohrad Oblast’, where 26 people suffered injuries. The same day, a Russian missile strike again took place in Kyiv Oblast’, where 15 people were wounded.
To the southwest, after the international agreement guaranteeing the unmolested export of Ukrainian grain was signed, the Russians launched a missile strike against the Odesa seaport, where there was grain cargo. Representatives from all of the West swiftly laid the whole blame on the Kremlin, immediately denying Russian disinformation its oxygen.
Ukrainian Politics and Activity in the Information War
Per Ukraine’s official count, Russian losses have exceeded 41,000 (not including private mercenaries and those mobilized in occupied territories). On July 22, President Zelensky announced the number of Ukrainian casualties: roughly 30 dead a day and some 250 injured—as previously, several times fewer than the numbers on the Russian side and more than three times fewer than during May and June.
Ukraine’s efforts in the information war continue to bear fruit. In another sign of Ukraine’s doggedness, the spelling of “Odesa” on Wikipedia has been Ukrainified and is now spelled “Odesa” instead of “Odessa” (which is the Russian spelling). Focusing on the much larger picture (which, admittedly, consists of smaller pictures that include the Ukrainified spelling of proper nouns), Foreign Minister Kuleba provided some sensible advice on the West’s strategy in the information war, repeating that outshouting Russian state media does not work—such media have no place in the marketplace of ideas, which they seek to decay from within, and must be shunned entirely.
Another facet of the information war and an important part of Ukraine’s discourse on international security for a few months now has been the subject/framing of Ukraine’s need to become a European Israel. This discourse continues today, as the Ukrainian administration seeks to reimagine the international security structure and to position itself as a unique defensive presence on the West’s eastern flank.
Meanwhile, Andriy Kostin, a lawyer and MP from President Zelenensky’s party, has been confirmed as Ukraine’s new Prosecutor General.
In a curious development, the SBU has exposed a massive botfarm that has been responsible for spreading strains about fictitious discord between President Zelensky and General Zaluzhny. What makes it curious is that the farm has ties to MPs in former President Poroshenko’s European Solidarity party. Per polling, Poroshenko is already among the least popular political figures in the country, and this revelation will do little to improve his public standing.
On July 31, Ukrainian media pointed to a new study by Yale researchers who assert that Western sanctions have indeed effectively crippled Russia’s economy—and will continue to do so if the West keeps its foot on the gas pedal and heeds the guidance of the Kyiv School of Economics and the McFaul-Yermak Working Group (the very same Yermak who has been repeatedly accused of being a Kremlin spy, yet who has incongruously been working to deny the Kremlin a functioning economy).
Ukrainian media also reported with some interest on the creation of the Whitman-Jolly-Yang-led Forward party in the United States. Coverage has been neutral and politely curious.
Russian Politics and Activity in the Information War
The Kremlin and its allies continue tightening what screws they can in the domestic information space, but their efforts are, as always, reactionary, poorly coordinated, and transparent.
On July 20, Lavrov has declared that the “geographical tasks” of the special operation have changed and that Russia intends to claim more territories. This is not news and should not be treated as such. It is confirmation of what we already knew, it is another attempt to frame the Kremlin as the main agent on the global stage, it is another attempt to project confidence to audiences both internal and external. But it is not a real change of the Kremlin’s goals—the dream of conquering Ukraine will never die—it is certainly not news, and treating it as such only plays into the Kremlin junta’s hands.
Kremlin officials and propagandists keep trying to convince the world that HIMARS are being destroyed one after another in Ukraine (note: note a single one has been destroyed), and the West is admirably countering these attempts by immediately, forcefully, and publicly refuting them. Ukraine has made it even easier on the West by forming an oversight organ whose purpose is to guarantee the HIMARS’ integrity.
On July 31, Russia celebrated Navy Day. In the city of Tyumen’, the administration congratulated locals with Navy Day and put up a celebratory poster…with the image of a U.S. aircraft carrier. After it was pointed out, they quickly took it down. Meanwhile, the same day, in occupied Crimea, the local “administration” alleged that a Ukrainian drone attacked Sevastopol’ and subsequently cancelled the parade that should have taken place in honor of Navy Day. No such drone attack actually took place, and Ukrainian intelligence believes this happened because the occupants feared they would be unable to provide security for the event. This is also indicative of local command’s flagging morale and lack of faith in their ability to ahead of a Ukrainian counter-offensive. In St. Petersburg, Putin made an appearance at the city’s parade, prompting a new round of mockery for (1) once again (as he did last year) announcing new, unparalleled missiles in Russia’s arsenal (jokes addressed everything from his senility to Russia’s reliance on older and older military tech); and (2) vanquishing a local mosquito. “Putin triumphed over a mosquito during his walk,” declared journalists in his pool, trying to cover up the fact that Putin’s right arm hung limply at his side. This coincides with a report by Ukrainian intelligence about how Putin’s inner circle is becoming more and more concerned about his health and how his body doubles are being used with increasing frequency.
On the subject of ever-declining morale and Russian losses: there are mass promotions in the Russian armed forces to the rank of junior lieutenant—more evidence of major gaps in the Russians’ command structure.
On July 31, Russian media feverishly covered every development in the situation along the Serbian-Kosovan border, extolling the discipline and leadership of the Kremlin-aligned Serbian government and vilifying what they portrayed as the NATO-backed Kosovan terrorists.
Otherwise, Russia’s information space remains unchanged. A staple strain of the Russian media diet: the E.U. continues to be on the edge of total disintegration—as it has been for nearly a decade.
By contrast, at a congress of the Free Peoples of Russia Forum on July 24, the Forum published an open call for a “decolonized,” “de-imperialized,” “de-Putinified” Russia and accompanied it with a proposed map* of a Russia disintegrated into 34 republics. This is the most visible and audacious such call by an overlooked branch of Russia’s opposition, and it should be augmented and echoed by supporters of a free, liberal, Western Russia. Note that the reformed white-blue-white tricolor would become the flag of the new Moscow Republic, presumably as the successor state.
Elsewhere in Europe
Much of Europe remains rallied around Ukraine. Poland has made a massive arms deal with South Korea to replenish what has been supplied to Ukraine. Slovenia, whose Foreign Minister was in Ukraine on July 27, is preparing another round of military aid for Ukraine. On July 28, Lithuania’s President Nauseda also visited Kyiv and announced another new military aid package as well. Norway has supplied Ukraine with 14 armored patrol vehicles.
Others in Europe—the Kremlin’s boon companions—are up to their usual tricks. In Hungary, Orban declared, unprompted, that Ukraine will never win and the war can only end with negotiations between Russia and America. As former MP Borislav Bereza blandly explained, Orban is either “inadequate” or “a backup dancer for Putin.” Subsequently, Orban claimed that Hungary was an ethnically “unmixed nation,” intending it as a good thing, which prompted much criticism and mockery and further delegitimized him as a good-faith member of the West.
Orban then continued to parrot Kremlin talking points, saying that NATO is escalating things with Russia instead of seeking peace—a classic strain of the Provocation theme.
Prompting much commentary from Ukrainian media, Belgium inaugurated a new Foreign Minister—Hadja Lahbib—who visited Crimea in 2021. On July 28, she wrote to Foreign Minister Kuleba a letter in which she unequivocally stated that Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory is inviolable and that Crimea and Donetsk are part of Ukraine. She did not mention last year’s visit.
Since the war began, public opinion about Russia in Bulgaria precipitously changed for the worse, and though most of the government was always not necessarily in the Kremlin’s court, its anti-Russian measures now have broad support, despite the Prime Minister’s suffering a no-confidence vote last month. The Prime Minister is vocal about Russian interference in Bulgaria’s internal affairs. On August 1, President Radev formally dissolved the parliament and called for snap elections for October 2.
A Lithuanian MP repeated the assertion-diagnosis that many commentators have been levying at the West—namely that Western politics are rife with those who yearn for business as usual and who are not prepared to live in a world in which Russia loses to Ukraine.
On July 31, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry warned Ukrainians not to visit southern Serbia because of a rapidly aggravating situation between Serbia and Kosovo after the Kosovan government was going to implement a policy requiring Serbs living in the north to apply for Kosovan license plates. Following a sudden spike in hostile posturing, Kosovo delayed implementation by a month.
Much as Ukrainian media are closely following the fortunes of Foreign Minister Liz Truss as she now stands against former Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak to become the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister, they are also paying heed to the political turmoil in Italy, where Prime Minister Draghi has made a much more successful second attempt to resign and a snap general election has been scheduled for September 25.
Finally, despite its Ivanishvili-controlled administration, Georgia has stopped permitting people whose passports say “Crimea, Russia” into the country.
Elsewhere in the World
Rep. Spartz is at it again, calling to suspend funding to the UN and suspend the international agreement on Ukrainian grain exports because Russia is not abiding by the terms. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister explained that she was once again serving the Kremlin’s interests with her new burst of activity.
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