Alexander Rojavin ’20, Law and Public Policy Scholar
Alexander Rojavin is a multilingual intelligence, media, and policy analyst specializing in information warfare. He is currently working on a book on modern Russian cinema as a key battlefield in the Kremlin’s information war. He is also co-chair of the Symposium on Disinformation Studies. In his spare time, he moonlights as a published literary translator (Routledge, Slavica Publishers, forthcoming Academic Studies Press).
What follows is a chronicle of key events, trends, and anomalies from day 182 through day 188 of the Russian-Ukrainian war for democracy.
This report summarizes the military situation across Ukraine, Ukraine’s politics and efforts in the information war, and Russia’s politics and efforts in the information war.
As ever, Russia’s rocket terror has not let up, and with Ukraine’s offensive actions in the south, it has even become more vengeful. Every day, and every night, civilians die from Russia’s missiles in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and other oblast’s.
This was a week that began with Ukraine’s Independence Day, which set the record for the number of missile alerts issued in Ukraine in a single day since the war began; statistically, the worst strike occurred in Chaplyne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast’, where a Russian missile hit a train station (as in Kramatorsk, months ago) and killed 22 people, 5 of whom burned alive, one of whom was 11.
The week ended, however, with Ukrainian forces’ finally beginning an offensive along the southern front, with Kherson in their sights.
Situation in Ukraine’s South
On August 29, Natalya Gumenyuk, press secretary of Ukraine’s southern command, announced the Ukrainian forces were beginning offensive operations in several directions along the southern front, including towards Kherson itself. She asked the media to refrain from detailed commentary until the appropriate moment so as not to disrupt the efforts. Ukrainian military sources soon confirmed that the “109th infantry regiment” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the Russian assault troops supporting them had retreated from Kakhovka. Headlines proclaiming that Ukraine’s forces had “broken through the first line of defense” tore through Ukraine’s information space, corroborated by a video recorded by a Russian soldier in the area. News subsequently surfaced that Ukrainian forces had destroyed a Russian-controlled machine repair center in occupied Beryslav. The Russians’ retaliation to the offensive, as always, included missile strikes at city centers—in Mykolaiv, by the next day, 24 people were soon injured, and 2 dead.
Weeks of Ukraine’s stymying Russia’s logistics in the area preempted this offensive. On August 25, Ukrainian forces had destroyed another couple of Russian command posts near Kakhovka and Beryslav, and they again struck at the Antoniv Bridge to keep it in a reliable state of disuse. On August 26, they cut off Russian movement across the Daryiv Bridge—tactically significant, and later in the day, Oleksiy Arestovych heavily implied that there would be much more exciting news by the end of the weekend. His implied promise came to pass.
Though some Russian media corroborated that there was a spike in activity in the region—Lenta reported Gumenyuk’s statement and subsequently that there was an evacuation underway in Nova Kakhovka—most played things by the book, ignoring the development and diverting audiences’ attention elsewhere, mostly to conspiracy theories concerning Dugina’s death and new and exciting (and untrue) strains about Ukrainian provocations at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP). The fervor with which they tried to distract audiences with ZNPP strains in particular betrayed a distinct note of panic. Soon, though, the Russian Ministry of Defense came out with its own official statement on the matter: per its version of events, Ukraine had attempted an ill-fated minor offensive actions in the south, losing 26 tanks, 23 IFVs, 9 AFVs, 2 fighter jets, and 560 soldiers in the process. On August 30, the already ludicrous numbers grew: turns out that, in the “minor offensive actions,” Ukraine had lost 48 tanks, 46 IFVs, 37 AFVs, 2 fighter jets, and >1,200 soldiers. There are lies, damn lies, statistics, and then whatever Russia’s Ministry of Defense is doing.
Per Ukraine’s southern command, they have so far eliminated ~160 Russian soldiers, 60 pieces of equipment, and 13 command posts in Kherson. And in a telling indicator of how things are going in the region, meta-data of a video posted by collaborationist Kirill Stremousov, the Kremlin-installed “deputy head of Kherson,” revealed that he has fled to Russia and is sitting in Voronezh. Not the clearest projection of confidence one could make.
Elsewhere in the south, Russia’s forces have not been enjoying themselves much either. News surfaced on August 26 that the Russians were rotating ten fighter jets out of the archipelago onto Russian territory to avoid further unpleasant surprises. On August 30, Sevastopol’s air defense appeared to be online again, shooting down another drone; turns out that Ukrainian forces know how to keep up steady psychological pressure too. And in Melitopol’, Ukrainian partisans maintain their much-felt presence: on August 28, partisans set off charges at a Russian base and the building where the city’s “referendum” was being prepared. The same evening, explosions and gunfire could be heard when the Russian garrison apparently spent 30 minutes trying to shoot down a drone. Meanwhile, in an enviable demonstration of Russian precision, a Russian fighter took out a public bathroom in a village in Kherson Oblast’ with an X-59 missile. It also became known that the occupiers brought ten mobile chemical labs to Melitopol’—potentially in case something untoward were to happen at the ZNPP, in which case the labs could be used to treat Russian troops in the area.
And at the ZNPP, Russian forces ceaselessly fire at objects in the vicinity. On August 30, it became clear that are were deliberately shelling the corridors that the IAEA mission, which arrived in Kyiv, is supposed to take to reach the ZNPP.
Also on August 30, Ukrainian media echoed Western media that the Russian Black Sea fleet has been hamstrung by repeated losses and is now only used for defensive purposes.
Situation in Ukraine’s East
Though Ukraine’s forces are advancing in the south, they are no strangers to multitasking and remain engaged across the eastern front also. On August 26, for instance, they destroyed a Russian base situated in a hotel in Kadiyivka, Luhansk Oblast’, eliminating roughly 200 Russian soldiers in the strike.
Ukrainian intelligence estimates there are between 4,500 and 5,000 Wagnerites fighting in Ukraine, mostly in the east, and they are often on the frontlines, better prepared than other Russian forces, and are deployed as assault troops, as we saw during the siege of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.
On August 29, while Ukrainian forces pressed forward in the south, the Russians tried to advance in six directions in the east and southeast—all unsuccessfully. Then, on August 30, reports surfaced that they had destroyed a Ukrainian Red Cross base in Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast’. The Russians also resumed their shelling of Kharkiv. Nine missiles hit the city in the morning. A kindergarten was among the targets.
Ukrainian Politics and Activity in the Information War
Ukraine’s confidence in the information war—already never at a deficit—has become even more pronounced in the past week.
On August 23, President Zelensky repeated that if the Azov fighters undergo any kind of show trial, the Kremlin will surrender all hope of negotiations. Unyielding words, which were followed by acute trolling from the Ministry of Defense on August 28, when its Twitter account published “a new character of modern Ukrainian folklore”—Bavovnyatko (roughly translated from Ukrainian as “Cottonkin” or “Cottonbaby”), a demonic cotton gremlin who wreaks havoc on Russian military objects. (As a reminder, this is a play on the Ukrainian word bavovna, which has become a Ukrainian meme-code any time a Russian target is eliminated, because Russian media describe any strike against their forces as a khlopok, meaning “loud clap,” while khlopok means “cotton”). Two days prior, the British Ambassador Melinda Simmons engaged in some trolling of her own by posting a photo of herself sitting with bundles of cotton, captioned “I recently found a new passion.”
And against the backdrop of Ukraine’s southern offensive, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kiril Budanov’s words from August 25 that the war’s key inflection point has already begun take on increased weight and believability.
Alongside projecting confidence and heralding their success, Ukrainian sources and officials do not stop reminding the world of the cost: at the time of this writing, at least 379 children have perished as a result of Russian missiles since February 24.
While Ukraine excels on the information front, its security services and diplomats have not been resting on laurels either. On August 24, Independence Day, the SBU stated that it successfully prevented the FSB from organizing counter-protests across the country. On August 27, it became known that Poland and the Czech Republic agreed to patrol Slovakia’s skies, as a result of which Slovakia will supply Ukraine with 11 MiG-29 fighters.
Also on August 27, Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers allowed sailors to leave the country in fulfillment of their duties or studies. This has been a huge point of contention for months, with many arguing that sailors need to be given this exemption in order to buffer Ukraine’s economy.
In Kherson, Russian propaganda has been cropping up on city objects, including billboards. On one billboard, it says “Kherson is with Russia for eternity” and features the photos of two children from Kyiv. The Ukrainian photographer discovered that the photo of her children is being used for Russian propaganda purposes and was, to put it mildly, displeased.
On August 30, Ukrainian media echoed a Washington Post report that Ukrainian forces are building decoy MLRS out of wood, which are fooling Russian forces into wasting missiles on them. Per the report’s count, at least 10 Kalibr missiles have been wasted on these wooden MLRS. This can partly explain the confidence of the Russian disinformation that more HIMARS have been destroyed than were ever in Ukraine’s possession.
Also from the realm of good news: the first Ukrainian ship with grain for Africa arrived in Djibouti on August 30.
Russian Politics and Activity in the Information War
Until August 29, the week went by without any particularly anomalous waves in Russia’s information space.
Kremlin-controlled outlets maintained their search for new conspiracy theory strains alleging that Ukraine is responsible for everything unpleasant happening at the ZNPP. One strain in particular seemed more daring than the others: it turns out that SBU agents, who had been creeping around the power station, kept in touch with their curators with the help of Elon Musk’s Starlink internet. Now there’s an interesting rabbit hole.
Another intriguing rabbit hole has been the one containing the myriad explorations of Natalya Vovk, a Ukrainian national who the FSB alleged killed Dugina. Russian officials and outlets tried to whip up audiences into a frenzy, cynically comparing the situation with Beslan and Nord-Ost. The most prominent meme from this episode is a photo of Vovk with her little son and cat, which prompted jokes of “The cat is the true mastermind behind Dugina’s death.”
Russian media have also been particularly upset with President Macron for the past week, and they continue to look for ways to discredit Foreign Minister (likely soon-to be Prime Minister) Truss.
Otherwise, everything is as it normally is. The West is on the brink of disintegration, Russophobia is rampant in the world, our enemies are simultaneously hopelessly disoriented and devilishly cunning, and the Zelensky administration is a cabal of coke-addicted Nazi cultists.
On August 24, Shoigu, who, per reporting from Roman Anin’s Important Stories, has been effectively sidelined, yapped that the slowdown of Russian advances in Ukraine is “intentional.” Nothing more than an attempt to save face, an attempt to project an air of control, an attempt to appear in the driver’s seat, an attempt to pull the wool over the audience’s eyes—an attempt that doesn’t merit much commentary beyond saying that the Kremlin is aware that its efforts are flagging.
On August 25, Yevgeny Royzman, the former mayor of Yekaterinburg, was arrested for “discrediting the army.” This prompted protests in Yekaterinburg. The leaders of the Russian opposition in exile (whose effectiveness/”effectiveness” and “clarity of vision” we’ve discussed before) are nevertheless accurately characterizing this as the “completion of the process of liquidating the legal opposition in Russia.” The Kremlin is practically at the bottom of the barrel now, and it should surprise nobody when FSB agents come for an actual legend like Yuri Shevchuk, rather than just trying to fine him like they did a few weeks back.
The same day, the Kremlin again put in practice the saying “the guilty mind betrays itself”—the same day that Russian forces shelled Kryvyi Rih with cluster munitions, Russian media hollered that the UN is investigating evidence that Ukrainian forces used cluster munitions.
The Kremlin’s digital manipulations continued later in the week too: on August 28, Russia’s Ministry of Defense released a video allegedly showing the destruction of Ukrainian forces, but if formal cinematic analysis wasn’t enough to make that claim demonstrably absurd, metadata revealed that the video was actually a recording of cadets exercising from late July. Episodes like this fit neatly against a backdrop of Russian media trying to outdo each other in allegations that Ukrainian MLRS strikes are cutting a swath through Ukraine’s civilian population. These allegations are clear-cut strains of the Ukrainian Fascist Junta meta-narrative, and they are unlikely to go away any time soon.
Western Media
In my continuing tangential commentary on Western coverage of the war, I offer the following example. On August 29, I turn on NPR for 30 seconds. I hear the words, “…at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which Russia and Ukraine are accusing each other of shelling.” I turn off NPR.
You got to love both-sidesism and false equivalence. No-no, NPR is quite right—a democratic nation’s claims and the claims of a terrorist regime hold the exact same weight and should be presented to the listeners—who are not necessarily equipped, through no fault of their own, with the knowledge to reach their own informed conclusions—as equal in value.
Western journalism—and U.S. journalism in particular—will not constitute an effective fourth estate until it sheds this toxic longing for the appearance of neutrality, which is not the same thing as true objectivity, as actual fidelity to facts.
Concluding Thoughts
Ukraine has begun the long-awaited offensive in the south, but that does not mean that victory is near at hand. Now is not the time to take the foot off the gas—support for Ukraine must be strengthened further. The Kremlin must know defeat, so that the slow, painful process of Russia’s rehabilitation and reintegration into the world can begin. It will know defeat, but the sooner, the better. Civilians continue to perish across Ukraine every day. An entire generation of children will carry this trauma their whole lives.
Now is not the time to dither.