{"id":1148,"date":"2016-03-11T08:00:47","date_gmt":"2016-03-11T13:00:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www2.law.temple.edu\/voices\/?p=1148"},"modified":"2016-07-28T12:23:10","modified_gmt":"2016-07-28T16:23:10","slug":"pattern-securitization-executive-compensation-evidence-regulatory-implications","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www2.law.temple.edu\/voices\/pattern-securitization-executive-compensation-evidence-regulatory-implications\/","title":{"rendered":"The Pattern in Securitization and Executive Compensation: Evidence and Regulatory Implications"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The Dodd-Frank financial reforms of 2010 promised to better align risk-reward incentives by, among other things, reducing imprudent securitization (i.e., sales of financial assets) and excessive executive compensation. This would, in turn, promote systemic stability. To assess whether Dodd-Frank\u2019s elaborate rules on securitization and compensation are likely to achieve this goal, we explore the connection between the two empirically. Using a unique dataset covering 1993-2009 \u2014 the largest of its kind \u2014 we find that securitizing banks (regulated depositaries) on average paid their CEOs twice as much as non-securitizing banks, a finding that is both statistically and economically significant. By contrast, non-bank (industrial) firms that securitized actually paid their CEOs less than non-securitizers. Because securitizing banks performed no better than other firms (non-securitizing banks or industrials), we find evidence of agency cost; because bank-originated securitizations performed especially poorly in the financial crisis, we find evidence of social cost.<\/p>\n<p>Our findings have important implications for Dodd-Frank, because its rules on securitization and compensation fail to account for the incentive effects of securitization by banks. Its compensation provisions are disconnected from controls on securitization, in particular its risk-retention (\u201cskin in the game\u201d) rules. Moreover, it focuses not on those who \u201coriginate\u201d securitizations, such as the banks we study, but instead the \u201csecuritizers\u201d who issue securities backed by the financial assets in question. Because banks originated many of the worst securitizations \u2014 and yet paid their CEOs more for doing so \u2014 Dodd-Frank may be aimed at the wrong segment of securitization. Simpler, better-tailored regulation that accounts for the pattern we observe would more likely achieve Dodd-Frank\u2019s goals of systemic stability and accountability.<\/p>\n<p><strong><a href=\"http:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715735\" target=\"_blank\">Download the Article at SSRN<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Dodd-Frank financial reforms of 2010 promised to better align risk-reward incentives by, among other things, reducing imprudent securitization (i.e., sales of financial assets) and excessive executive compensation. This would, in turn, promote systemic stability. To assess whether Dodd-Frank\u2019s elaborate rules on securitization and compensation are likely to achieve this goal, we explore the connection between the two empirically. Using a unique dataset covering 1993-2009 \u2014 the largest of its kind \u2014 we find that securitizing banks (regulated depositaries) on average paid their CEOs twice as much as non-securitizing banks, a finding that is both statistically and economically significant. By contrast, non-bank (industrial) firms that securitized actually paid their CEOs less than non-securitizers. Because securitizing banks performed no better than other firms (non-securitizing banks or industrials), we find evidence of agency cost; because bank-originated securitizations performed especially poorly in the financial crisis, we find evidence of social cost. Our findings have important implications for Dodd-Frank, because its rules on securitization and compensation fail to account for the incentive effects of securitization by banks. Its compensation &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":915,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[358,356,357],"audience":[],"coauthors":[35],"class_list":["post-1148","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-faculty-scholarship","tag-business-law","tag-dodd-frank","tag-securitization"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\r\n<title>The Pattern in Securitization and Executive Compensation: Evidence and Regulatory Implications - Voices at Temple<\/title>\r\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\r\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www2.law.temple.edu\/voices\/pattern-securitization-executive-compensation-evidence-regulatory-implications\/\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Pattern in Securitization and Executive Compensation: Evidence and Regulatory Implications - Voices at Temple\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The Dodd-Frank financial reforms of 2010 promised to better align risk-reward incentives by, among other things, reducing imprudent securitization (i.e., sales of financial assets) and excessive executive compensation. This would, in turn, promote systemic stability. To assess whether Dodd-Frank\u2019s elaborate rules on securitization and compensation are likely to achieve this goal, we explore the connection between the two empirically. Using a unique dataset covering 1993-2009 \u2014 the largest of its kind \u2014 we find that securitizing banks (regulated depositaries) on average paid their CEOs twice as much as non-securitizing banks, a finding that is both statistically and economically significant. By contrast, non-bank (industrial) firms that securitized actually paid their CEOs less than non-securitizers. Because securitizing banks performed no better than other firms (non-securitizing banks or industrials), we find evidence of agency cost; because bank-originated securitizations performed especially poorly in the financial crisis, we find evidence of social cost. Our findings have important implications for Dodd-Frank, because its rules on securitization and compensation fail to account for the incentive effects of securitization by banks. Its compensation &hellip;\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www2.law.temple.edu\/voices\/pattern-securitization-executive-compensation-evidence-regulatory-implications\/\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Voices at Temple\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2016-03-11T13:00:47+00:00\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2016-07-28T16:23:10+00:00\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www2.law.temple.edu\/voices\/cms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/01\/Financial-Newspaper.png\" \/>\r\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"840\" \/>\r\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"560\" \/>\r\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\r\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Jonathan C. Lipson\" \/>\r\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\r\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Jonathan C. Lipson\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"1 minute\" \/>\r\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www2.law.temple.edu\\\/voices\\\/pattern-securitization-executive-compensation-evidence-regulatory-implications\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www2.law.temple.edu\\\/voices\\\/pattern-securitization-executive-compensation-evidence-regulatory-implications\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Beckie Schatschneider\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www2.law.temple.edu\\\/voices\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/505b7875ef49205bf81379b92d47f94e\"},\"headline\":\"The Pattern in Securitization and Executive Compensation: Evidence and Regulatory Implications\",\"datePublished\":\"2016-03-11T13:00:47+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-07-28T16:23:10+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www2.law.temple.edu\\\/voices\\\/pattern-securitization-executive-compensation-evidence-regulatory-implications\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":284,\"commentCount\":0,\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www2.law.temple.edu\\\/voices\\\/pattern-securitization-executive-compensation-evidence-regulatory-implications\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www2.law.temple.edu\\\/voices\\\/cms\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2016\\\/01\\\/Financial-Newspaper.png\",\"keywords\":[\"Business Law\",\"Dodd-Frank\",\"securitization\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Faculty Scholarship\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www2.law.temple.edu\\\/voices\\\/pattern-securitization-executive-compensation-evidence-regulatory-implications\\\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www2.law.temple.edu\\\/voices\\\/pattern-securitization-executive-compensation-evidence-regulatory-implications\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www2.law.temple.edu\\\/voices\\\/pattern-securitization-executive-compensation-evidence-regulatory-implications\\\/\",\"name\":\"The Pattern in Securitization and Executive Compensation: Evidence and Regulatory Implications - 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