{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Voices at Temple","provider_url":"https:\/\/www2.law.temple.edu\/voices","title":"Turning the Kaleidoscope: Toward a Theory of Interpreting Precedents - Voices at Temple","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"cKnpj2Jk3c\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www2.law.temple.edu\/voices\/turning-kaleidoscope-toward-theory-interpreting-precedents-2\/\">Turning the Kaleidoscope: Toward a Theory of Interpreting Precedents<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www2.law.temple.edu\/voices\/turning-kaleidoscope-toward-theory-interpreting-precedents-2\/embed\/#?secret=cKnpj2Jk3c\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;Turning the Kaleidoscope: Toward a Theory of Interpreting Precedents&#8221; &#8212; Voices at Temple\" data-secret=\"cKnpj2Jk3c\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/* <![CDATA[ *\/\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/www2.law.temple.edu\/voices\/cms\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n\/* ]]> *\/\n<\/script>\n","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/www2.law.temple.edu\/voices\/cms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/03\/Kaleidoscope-Green-FacScholarship.png","thumbnail_width":840,"thumbnail_height":560,"description":"A full generation of legal scholarship has analyzed methods of interpreting statutory and constitutional provisions. Different works have emphasized text, original intent, original reception, and dynamic \u201cliving\u201d meaning as academics have argued over which methodological systems describe current practice, and which systems are normatively best. Comparable methodological debates have not occurred with respect to judicial decisions. This Article examines precedents as a third category of legal authorities that &#8212; much like statutes and constitutions &#8212; sometimes present vague answers to important legal questions. This Article\u2019s system of precedential interpretation will challenge unexamined intuitions about \u201creading cases,\u201d with collateral implications for statutory and constitutional interpretation as well. I consider four categories of historical materials to generate different sorts of precedential meaning: (i) an opinion\u2019s text, indicating a decision\u2019s declared meaning; (ii) adjudicative context, reflecting a precedent\u2019s implied meaning; (iii) reception by contemporary analysts, which depict understood meaning; and (iv) subsequent doctrinal applications, which identify developmental meaning. These categories offer analogies to forms of textualism, originalism, and dynamism that are well known in other legal contexts. Different &hellip;"}